«Research dealing with so called 'social' bandits of specific areas in Latin America and also China .. The bandits of Guangdong China ...» Document abstract
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political science
presentation
date published
22/04/2008
review : not yet assessed
level : General public
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The myth of Robin Hood has not only created a long lasting fairy tale for our youth it has also created the definition of what Eric Hobsbawm calls a social bandit: one who gives to the poor by taking from the rich. Hobsbawm uses the myth of Robin Hood to identify bandits who have reached a certain plateau in their regional societies to be declared social bandits. These social bandits were supposed to have been pre-political demonstrators on behalf of the peasant population against those who had power in society. Alongside the definition of what a social bandit was supposed to emulate Hobsbawm gives criteria for who a social bandit was: mostly comprised of peasants in dire economic straits. However both the image of so-called social bandits and who a social bandit was in Hobsbawms view and also the view of peasants themselves were mere psychological creations; the reality of who their celebrated bandits does not qualify them for Hobsbawms definition of social bandits specifically in the Chinese region.
- Research dealing with so called 'social' bandits of specific areas in Latin America and also China .
- The bandits of Guangdong China are a direct contradiction to who Hobsbawm believed made up most the population of bandits in society.
- Social banditry in the modern world still remains in certain regions, and rather than disappearing it is merely evolving.
- Another difference between past and present in modern society's classification of terrorists.
- The social bandit defined by Eric Hobsbawm is a noble idea>
« with the RUF. NPRC's Chairman, Capt. Valentine Starasser, dismissed the RUF and labeled them "bandits". His refusal to negotiate ...» Document abstract
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international relations
presentation
date published
19/04/2008
review : not yet assessed
level : General public
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Overview
After the Cold War the majority of wars in Africa were "societal" while conflict between states was considerably rare. The inter-state wars were further prolonged and worsened by foreign support. Military assistance on part of Western and Socialist countries is one of the common outside causes for many of the ethnic and inter-communal conflicts in several African regions (Marshall, 2005; Pollard & Odo, 2004).
Key Words- Conflicts, West Africa, Senegal, Guinea-Bissau, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Cote d'Ivoire, Liberia
Case Study: Sierra Leone, RUF, Foday Saybana Sankoh, APC, The Abidjan Process, ECOMOG, AFRC-RUF, The Lome Agreement, ECOWAS, UNOMIL
After the Cold War the majority of wars in Africa were "societal" while conflict between states was considerably rare. The inter-state wars were further prolonged and worsened by foreign support. Military assistance on part of Western and Socialist countries is one of the common outside causes for many of the ethnic and inter-communal conflicts in several African regions (Marshall, 2005; Pollard & Odo, 2004).
Key Words- Conflicts, West Africa, Senegal, Guinea-Bissau, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Cote d'Ivoire, Liberia
Case Study: Sierra Leone, RUF, Foday Saybana Sankoh, APC, The Abidjan Process, ECOMOG, AFRC-RUF, The Lome Agreement, ECOWAS, UNOMIL
- Overview.
- Conflict Trends in West Africa.
- The Roots of Conflicts.
- Case Study: Sierra Leone.
- Conflict Background.
- The Abidjan Process (1995-1996).
- ECOMOG.
- The Lome Agreement.
- What Went Wrong?
- Case Study: Liberia.
- Conflict Background.
- The Peace Process.
To what extent is the clausewitzian account of war a political instrument relevant in the twenty-first century ?
« of War, the protagonists of twenty-first century wars will not be armies, but groups whom we today call terrorists, guerillas, bandits, and robbers. ...» Document abstract
$4.95
political science
presentation
date published
28/01/2005
review : not yet assessed
level : Advanced
requested 44 times
Clausewitz's description of war as a means to an end or, to use his own formulation, the continuation of politics by other means, must be interpreted against the contemporary intellectual background: the majority of enlightenment writers had regarded war as an aberration, an interruption of political intercourse, the point where human reason came to an end . This view can be said to have influenced the actual conduct of war in as much as most eighteenth-century commanders tried to make war in a cautious, civilised manner while minimising the damage to the environment . Thus, when Clausewitz insisted that war was simply one of the forms taken on by political intercourse, that it was a language of politics that should be formulated on the basis of carefully assessed cost-benefit analysis, he was making a new and important point.
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- War can to a lesser and lesser degree be waged on behalf of a strictly trinitarian state structure
- Twenty-first century war will be more impulsive, blind, habitual, and desperate than purposive, intelligent, and rational. That mades Clausewits's rational theory of war irrelevant.
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