« Communism in the USA Introduction To establish a real picture of communism in the USA and to understand its actual situation, I will first talk about the ...» Document abstract
$2.95
3 word format
Language : english
international relations
presentation
date published
29/01/2002
review : not yet assessed
level : Advanced
requested 45 times
SummaryTo establish a real picture of communism in the USA and to understand its actual situation, I will first talk about the reasons why the USA cannot be seen as the best place to be a communist and then I will ask myself whether we can say there is an agony of communism in the country since 1990.
Table of Contents- The USA: a bad place for communism
- Communism is against all American values
- A deeply rooted anticommunism
- Since 1990, the agony of communism '
- The CPUSA: the failure of the European model
- A possible renewal '
Les internautes ont également acheté « On the contrary, the fall of Communism created an ideological vacuum and forced future member-state and the development of ambiguous relations with the USA. ...» Document abstract
$9.95
11 word format
Language : english
european union
presentation
date published
29/11/2006
review : not yet assessed
level : Expert
requested 30 times
Summary“You don’t fall in love with a common market” (EU Commission President Jacques Delors in The European, 3 November 1994).
Here emerges one of today’s most challenging issues for the European Union: the prevalence of market integration has created a political vacuum and so-called “democratic deficit”, essentially for lack of a genuine identification from the European citizens with European stakes.
Indeed, it would be simplistic to consider that the EU project has failed in generating support from the peoples of the member states and, consequently, in establishing the democratic bases it lacks today. The reality is that the very project of the “Founding Fathers”, as presented in the Schuman Declaration (9 May 1950) relied on a combination of functionalism and technocratism that largely explains the a-political trajectory of the European construction. Theses developed by E. Haas in The Uniting of Europe (1958) relied on the dynamic of sector-related integration that should be initiated by “concrete achievements that first create a de facto solidarity”. So economic integration was supposed to create “common fates” between the member-states and to trigger an ineluctable spiral of integration (“spill over”) from economic to political integration. But, the practical requirement of such a theory equated a rational long-term planning incompatible with the emotional short-term demands of member-states’ publics. So the European project was deliberately placed in the hands of experts able to supervise a rationalized construction without letting any vested interest or passions interfering.
So the choice of technocratism entailed both a depoliticisation of the European construction and a founding contradiction: functionalism wanted economic integration to be a first step in European integration but technocratism prevented political integration from emerging.
But as the Union was moving from “issues of instrumental problem-solving to fundamental questions about its nature as part-formed polity” (Cable, 1994; Garcia, 1993; BBV foundation, 1993. in Laffan, 1996:p 82), the absence of political spill over become all the more problematic since it began to damage the legitimacy of the overall European project. That is why in 1992, the Treaty of Maastricht tried not only to fill in the gap between economic and political integration, towards the key-project of single currency, but also to promote the idea that “the maintenance of economic integration [rested] in some measure on political integration”, intrinsically linked with the emergence of a “sense of community” (Laffan: 96). So the “identity deficit” was officially presented as a fundamental barrier to the EU functioning insofar as the very European project relies on the presupposition of a “European transcending community of fates, values, lives, socio-economic stakes and of responsibility” (European Identity Charter, 1995). So one thing was to presuppose the potentiality of a strong European identity; another was to stimulate it. In that perspective, analyses of 1992 Eurobarometer clearly revealed the weakness of the sentiment of identification to the EU: attachment to Europe (48% against 51% of people who “never felt European) still appeared distanced by attachments to respectively the country (88%), the region (87%) and the village (85%) (Reif, 1993 in Laffan: 99).
Then, the new focus on “we feeling” opted in favour of the transposition of the spill over logic in which citizenship would be used as a Trojan horse. By transforming the “European worker” defined by the 1986 Single act into a “European citizen”, the Treaty of Maastricht and the 1995 Schengen Agreements intended to raise of the “We feel European” by implementing concrete European political rights. But the European citizenship remained determined by the centrality of national citizenships insofar as being a European citizen equals being a citizen of one of the EU member-states. Furthermore, citizenship is an imperfect tool in the sense that identity both precedes (what meaning for a citizenship without feeling part of an imagined community?) and prolongs citizenship (how to feel responsible without identifying with?). For all that, citizenship seems quite unlikely to generate a real “sense of community” and a transcending European identity by itself. On the contrary, only a strong European identity could give a real signification to the European citizenship and could enable the EU to challenge the nation-state’s political legitimacy monopoly.
As a consequence, two questions appear central in the identity deficit.
Firstly, how to articulate European identity and national, or even regional, local identities? Obviously, if a transcending European identity were to emerge, it would not be without (and even less against) national identities. So the sole credible basis on which to promote a European identity is member-states’ themselves, and more precisely on identity policies that would emphasize what is commonly shared rather than what differentiates between them. So, to adapt the European recurrent motto “unity in diversity”, the European identity has to be understood as an “identity of identities”. Then the articulation issue is all the more complex since the EU has to deal with the very nature of the identity it wants to shape. In other word, whereas national identities emerged essentially through the influence of the myth of national sovereignty and a very close sense of patriotism, the European identity can only be imagined as open and outstripping particular and often dangerous nationalist myths.
So the second question concerns the appropriate levers that will help the European identity emerging. What are the components of the European identity? The determination of such levers is all the more difficult since contrarily to the sentiment towards integration that can be conditioned by “materialistic” elements (sentiment of having benefited, sentiment of re-conquering power through the EU…), there is no such thing as an “interest of feeling European”. So the European identity relies on symbolic, psychological, ideological (cosmopolitanism or nationalism…) or emotional elements rather than on rational balances.
So I will try to answer this very question of the most significant components of a European identity (or negatively what is the most detrimental to the consolidation of a European identity?) in the light of three major axes that corresponds to the three dimension of identity (political, emotional, differentiation): “constitutional patriotism” (I), symbolic (II), and the “constitutive Other” (III).
To examine the impact of those three components on the European identity, I chose to work on the question Q46 of the eb620 questionnaire: “Would you say you are very proud, fairly proud, not very proud, not at all proud to be European?” as dependent variable (29334 respondents).
Such a question presents the great interest of being disconnected with comparisons between European identity and national identities and to consider the pride of being European as an overarching sentiment.
Here emerges one of today’s most challenging issues for the European Union: the prevalence of market integration has created a political vacuum and so-called “democratic deficit”, essentially for lack of a genuine identification from the European citizens with European stakes.
Indeed, it would be simplistic to consider that the EU project has failed in generating support from the peoples of the member states and, consequently, in establishing the democratic bases it lacks today. The reality is that the very project of the “Founding Fathers”, as presented in the Schuman Declaration (9 May 1950) relied on a combination of functionalism and technocratism that largely explains the a-political trajectory of the European construction. Theses developed by E. Haas in The Uniting of Europe (1958) relied on the dynamic of sector-related integration that should be initiated by “concrete achievements that first create a de facto solidarity”. So economic integration was supposed to create “common fates” between the member-states and to trigger an ineluctable spiral of integration (“spill over”) from economic to political integration. But, the practical requirement of such a theory equated a rational long-term planning incompatible with the emotional short-term demands of member-states’ publics. So the European project was deliberately placed in the hands of experts able to supervise a rationalized construction without letting any vested interest or passions interfering.
So the choice of technocratism entailed both a depoliticisation of the European construction and a founding contradiction: functionalism wanted economic integration to be a first step in European integration but technocratism prevented political integration from emerging.
But as the Union was moving from “issues of instrumental problem-solving to fundamental questions about its nature as part-formed polity” (Cable, 1994; Garcia, 1993; BBV foundation, 1993. in Laffan, 1996:p 82), the absence of political spill over become all the more problematic since it began to damage the legitimacy of the overall European project. That is why in 1992, the Treaty of Maastricht tried not only to fill in the gap between economic and political integration, towards the key-project of single currency, but also to promote the idea that “the maintenance of economic integration [rested] in some measure on political integration”, intrinsically linked with the emergence of a “sense of community” (Laffan: 96). So the “identity deficit” was officially presented as a fundamental barrier to the EU functioning insofar as the very European project relies on the presupposition of a “European transcending community of fates, values, lives, socio-economic stakes and of responsibility” (European Identity Charter, 1995). So one thing was to presuppose the potentiality of a strong European identity; another was to stimulate it. In that perspective, analyses of 1992 Eurobarometer clearly revealed the weakness of the sentiment of identification to the EU: attachment to Europe (48% against 51% of people who “never felt European) still appeared distanced by attachments to respectively the country (88%), the region (87%) and the village (85%) (Reif, 1993 in Laffan: 99).
Then, the new focus on “we feeling” opted in favour of the transposition of the spill over logic in which citizenship would be used as a Trojan horse. By transforming the “European worker” defined by the 1986 Single act into a “European citizen”, the Treaty of Maastricht and the 1995 Schengen Agreements intended to raise of the “We feel European” by implementing concrete European political rights. But the European citizenship remained determined by the centrality of national citizenships insofar as being a European citizen equals being a citizen of one of the EU member-states. Furthermore, citizenship is an imperfect tool in the sense that identity both precedes (what meaning for a citizenship without feeling part of an imagined community?) and prolongs citizenship (how to feel responsible without identifying with?). For all that, citizenship seems quite unlikely to generate a real “sense of community” and a transcending European identity by itself. On the contrary, only a strong European identity could give a real signification to the European citizenship and could enable the EU to challenge the nation-state’s political legitimacy monopoly.
As a consequence, two questions appear central in the identity deficit.
Firstly, how to articulate European identity and national, or even regional, local identities? Obviously, if a transcending European identity were to emerge, it would not be without (and even less against) national identities. So the sole credible basis on which to promote a European identity is member-states’ themselves, and more precisely on identity policies that would emphasize what is commonly shared rather than what differentiates between them. So, to adapt the European recurrent motto “unity in diversity”, the European identity has to be understood as an “identity of identities”. Then the articulation issue is all the more complex since the EU has to deal with the very nature of the identity it wants to shape. In other word, whereas national identities emerged essentially through the influence of the myth of national sovereignty and a very close sense of patriotism, the European identity can only be imagined as open and outstripping particular and often dangerous nationalist myths.
So the second question concerns the appropriate levers that will help the European identity emerging. What are the components of the European identity? The determination of such levers is all the more difficult since contrarily to the sentiment towards integration that can be conditioned by “materialistic” elements (sentiment of having benefited, sentiment of re-conquering power through the EU…), there is no such thing as an “interest of feeling European”. So the European identity relies on symbolic, psychological, ideological (cosmopolitanism or nationalism…) or emotional elements rather than on rational balances.
So I will try to answer this very question of the most significant components of a European identity (or negatively what is the most detrimental to the consolidation of a European identity?) in the light of three major axes that corresponds to the three dimension of identity (political, emotional, differentiation): “constitutional patriotism” (I), symbolic (II), and the “constitutive Other” (III).
To examine the impact of those three components on the European identity, I chose to work on the question Q46 of the eb620 questionnaire: “Would you say you are very proud, fairly proud, not very proud, not at all proud to be European?” as dependent variable (29334 respondents).
Such a question presents the great interest of being disconnected with comparisons between European identity and national identities and to consider the pride of being European as an overarching sentiment.
Table of Contents- ´Constitutional patriotism´.
- Literature.
- Model.
- Data.
- Results.
- Symbols and iconography.
- The ´constitutive other´.
« A reference to communism is even made in the first line of the song, with the mentioning of "Red It was a parody version of "Back in the USA" by Chuck Berry. ...» Document abstract
$3.95
4 word format
Language : english
history 1789 to present
presentation
date published
16/05/2008
review : not yet assessed
level : General public
requested 0 times
SummaryMusic serves as a reflection of a society. When a society is prospering, the music is noticeably happier, such as the Big Band phenomenon in the roaring 20’s. The same principle applies to a society going through rough times, such as jazz during the years of the Great Depression. The Cold War Years in America were filled with fear and tension. The two superpowers of the world, the United States and the U.S.S.R., were in a rivalry of epic proportions. This paper will explore how popular music during the Cold War mirrored the fears and anxieties of the American public by exploring and analyzing the songs of various influential artists, including Billy Joel, Prince, the Beatles, and Nena.
Table of Contents- Billy Joel wrote a revolutionary song at this time of enormous unrest.
- Continuing his recital of the history of the Cold War, Joel keeps naming those responsible.
- Another song written during the uncertain times of the Cold War was 'Back In the USSR,' by the Beatles.
- 99 Red Balloons by Nena was a song about a tragic scenario.
- When the Cold War ended with the collapse of Soviet Union in 1991, the music of the time changed drastically.
« Greek Immigration to USA The immigration of Greeks to America is a long history, one which spans over two The Balkans: From Constantinople to Communism. ...» Document abstract
$9.95
14 word format
Language : english
arts and art history
research papers
date published
01/04/2008
review : not yet assessed
level : Advanced
requested 0 times
SummaryBy the eve of the Greco-Turkish War of 1922, every Greek in the world understood and felt what the ‘Megali Idea’ meant. Under the leadership of Eleftherios Venizelos, Greece was on the verge of fulfilling Megali Idea in recreating a modern Byzantine Empire. But what exactly does Megali Idea mean? Megali Idea translates literally as the ‘Great Idea.’(Glenny, 45). It is a term that scholars use to encompass all Greek irridentist claims to expand in order to incorporate all ethnic Greeks within her boundaries. It is a vision of an expanded Greek state with Greek Orthodoxy as its official religion, “which aspired to the unification of all areas of Greek settlement in the Near East within the bounds of a single state, with its capital in Constantinople, dominated the independent state during the first century of its existence.”(Gerolymatos, 59). This irridentist claim was so influential in the late 19th century-early 20th century contemporary Greek society, that when ethnic Greeks immigrated to the United States in search of work, they kept this sentiment with them. Because of the Greek Orthodox Church of America, they were able to preserve the ideals of Megali Idea even in the United States. The preservation of Megali Idea among Greek immigrants felt was illustrated by the fact that many Greek-Americans returned to their homeland to fight for Greece in 1912. The main focus of this paper will be on George Dilboy, the main character of the biography Georgie! My Georgie!. Dilboy was a Greek-American who felt the calling of Megali Idea and returned to Greece to fight in the Balkan Wars. After describing the rise and fall of the concept of Megali Idea, we will thus conclude that Megali Idea not only stayed with Greeks when they immigrated to the United States, but is still echoed in conversations today.
Table of Contents- The Rise of the ‘Megali Idea?.
- The new kingdom's citizenry viewed the peace settlement as bittersweet.
- The Ottoman Empire was still a very large territory.
- The new Greek identity that was formed by Megali Idea became a composite of both Hellenic and Byzantine elements.
- Greece looked for more opportunities to gain more land in the Balkan peninsula.
- Greece's initial intention was to unite Crete with Greece and within nine months.
- Up until the Civil War, there was minimal migration from Greece to America.
- The heart of the Greek community was shifted from New Orleans to Chicago.
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