Droits de l'homme - au-delà du paradigme universalisme / relativisme, comment promouvoir une approche des principes moraux commune et respectueuse des cultures

This article underlines the limitations of the relativistic/universalistic paradigm in regard to the human rights qualification. It defends a third path which consists in a genuine intercultural dialogue, taking into account local specificities in order to promote common moral principles. The debate about female circumcision will be used to illustrate these theoretical considerations. As we are pondering the meaning of development, the debate about human rights rapidly appears. Does development imply a promotion and respect of these rights ? There seems to be a logical positive answer to this question, which is often repeated by various international institutions such as the World Bank, which « believes that creating the conditions for the attainment of human rights is a central and irreducible goal of development », and that « by placing the dignity of every human being - especially the poorest - at the very foundation of its approach to development, the Bank helps people in every part of the world build lives of purpose and hope ». Countries, NGOs, associations also use the notion in various ways to define and execute legal, political or economic actions in other cultural contexts. They feel legitimate, acting in the name of Human Rights to defend and implement them, as they have been defined as universal, that is as common standards of achievement for all peoples and all nations. Human rights can also be posed as a precondition attached to aid or trade agreements. Finally, it can stain a country's image and therefore discourage investors, tourists, etc. (Brems, 2001, p. 7). However, our anthropological point of view led us to question the proclaimed universality of Human Rights. Are the values, the moral principles and the vision of the society supported by the Declaration the real reflect of an international agreement? Should we not consider that they have been created in a particular context, the Western one, that they are consequently relative and should not be imposed to other cultures? But then, how to combine different perceptions of what is wrong and right? Or should we determine to the statement that they are not combinable? How to "solve the co-existence in the world of value systems that conflict with each other and which are not, necessarily, mutually consistent?" asks O'Sullivan (p.26). These are some of the questions that will be raised throughout this paper.