«Martin Wolf, a British economist and prominent journalist at the Financial Times, is an ardent defender of globalization, i.e. of global economic integration through free trade. His book aims to demonstrate that globalization makes the world better...» Document abstract
$2.95
economics
presentation
date published
02/01/2007
review : not yet assessed
level : Advanced
requested 13 times
Martin Wolf, a British economist and prominent journalist at the Financial Times, is an ardent defender of globalization, i.e. of global economic integration through free trade. His book aims to demonstrate that globalization makes the world better off and that the problem is not that there is too much globalization but far too little. Why Globalization Works is a response to people and organizations opposed to globalization and a thorough refutation of their main objections. Yet, Martin Wolf is a realist and does not try to convince the reader that we live in the best of all possible worlds. As an economist at the World Bank from 1971-81, he experienced the failure of international organizations to reduce poverty. Wolf also concedes that market driven globalization is far from perfect in practice. He argues that like democracy - globalization is nevertheless the best practical alternative by far despite its many downsides. Defender of economic liberalism but not of laissez-faire, he points out the necessary role of governments and the necessary reforms of international organizations to enable better and deeper global economic integration. Unlike Martin Wolfs book, this review essay is focused on globalization with a US perspective and a historical approach. This paper aims to select and explain Martin Wolfs arguments relevant for the United States. What does Why Globalization Works tell us about the historical and current impacts of globalization on the United States? What the United States should do regarding globalization?
- Globalization has always existed
- Wof refutes the fear of pauper labor and the 'myth of de-industrialization?
«In sharecropping contracts with cost sharing, why is the cost share borne by the tenant equal to the output share accruing to him?
Sharecropping is an arrangement or system of farming, prevalent in many Less Developed Countries in which a tenant...» Document abstract
$5.95
economics
presentation
date published
11/12/2006
review : not yet assessed
level : Advanced
requested 14 times
In sharecropping contracts with cost sharing, why is the cost share borne by the tenant equal to the output share accruing to him?
Sharecropping is an arrangement or system of farming, prevalent in many Less Developed Countries in which a tenant works on land which he does not own, giving the landowner a share of the output, instead of paying him a fixed rent -typical of fixed rent contracts. The tenants output is shared between the landlord and the tenant with a predetermined proportion. There is no fixed part of the rent. Sharecropping with cost sharing is a contract where inputs costs are shared between the landlord and the tenant.
Is it not uncommon to observe that in sharecropping contracts with cost sharing, the cost share borne by the tenant is equal to the output share accruing to him? Why does sharecropping with cost sharing exist? What are the advantages for tenants and for landlords? Do share contracts with the cost share borne by the tenant equivalent to the output share accruing to him exist in the world?
Sharecropping is an arrangement or system of farming, prevalent in many Less Developed Countries in which a tenant works on land which he does not own, giving the landowner a share of the output, instead of paying him a fixed rent -typical of fixed rent contracts. The tenants output is shared between the landlord and the tenant with a predetermined proportion. There is no fixed part of the rent. Sharecropping with cost sharing is a contract where inputs costs are shared between the landlord and the tenant.
Is it not uncommon to observe that in sharecropping contracts with cost sharing, the cost share borne by the tenant is equal to the output share accruing to him? Why does sharecropping with cost sharing exist? What are the advantages for tenants and for landlords? Do share contracts with the cost share borne by the tenant equivalent to the output share accruing to him exist in the world?
- Different forms of tenancy
- The neoclassical economist approach of sharecropping
- Why the sharecropping contract is superior to the others contracts
- The landlord is efficient for managing, and the tenant for supervising
- Transaction costs and other inputs
- The adverse risk is a dilemma for sharecropping
«The general increase in volatility of the
nancial markets can be partly explained by the growing uncertainly of the economic environment. It is, on the other hand, a reflection of the growing efficiency and integration of the financial markets...» Document abstract
$9.95
finance
theses
date published
29/11/2006
review : not yet assessed
level : Expert
requested 23 times
The general increase in volatility of the
nancial markets can be partly explained by the growing uncertainly of the economic environment. It is, on the other hand, a reflection of the growing efficiency and integration of the financial markets allow the almostinstantaneous move of capital from one market place to another and therefore the rapid
assimilation of any new, available information. Until the last years, the investors had not seen consecutive negative annual stock market returns since the 1970s. In contrast, during the 1980s and 1990s the market produced its best 20-year performance ever.
In fact, Most investors, portfolio managers, corporate financial analysts, investment bankers, commercial bank loan o¢ cers, security analysts and bond-rating agencies are concerned about the uncertainty of the returns on their investment assets, caused by the variability in speculative market prices (market risk) and the instability of business performance (credit risk) Derivative instruments have made hedging of such risks possible.
Hedging allows the selling of such risks by the hedgers, or suppliers of risk, to the speculators, or buyers of risk, but only when such risks are systematic, i.e., when they show a certain form on inertia or stability. Indeed, the current derivative markets are regular markets where "stable, » . Unfortunately, all there financial markets su¤er from major deficiencies.
The notion that risk matters, and that riskier investments should have a higher expected return than safer investments, to be considered good investments, is intuitive. Thus, the expected return on any investment can be written as the sum of the risk-free rate and an extra return to compensate for the risk. The risk premium is a fundamental
and critical component in portfolio management, corporate finance and in valuation. Given its importance, it is surprising that more attention has not been paid in practical terms to estimation issues. The disagreement in both theoretical and practical terms remains on how to measure the risk, and how to convert the risk measure into an expected return that compensates for risk.
The estimation of the equity risk premium is in general a di¢ cult task, but in emerging markets the challenge is simply formidable, for at least two reasons. First, usually in emerging markets researches have to cope with the general lack of relevant data, particularly the long series that are needed to study the equity premium. Second, even if
the world equity premium were stable, the equity risk premium of an emerging market may change over time, as its degree of integration to world capital markets change.
The objective of this work is to provide an estimation of the Tunisian Market Risk
Premium following the papers of Damodaran (2002) , Godfrey, S. and R. Espinosa, (1996),
Fama, Eugene F., and Kenneth R. French, (2002) and Hamilton, J. (1989).
To attempt this objective, our works will be structured as follows. First, we present some generalities about the financial market and the financial assets. Next, we present the financial risk and the methods of measurement. In the third chapter, we will define the market risk premium and present some methods which will be used to estimate this number for the Tunisian market. Finally, we use these models to estimate the Tunisian Market
Risk Premium over more than one decade. This last chapter is based upon BVMT index, the money market rate, the inflation rate and dividend data collected from "La Bourse des Valeurs Mobileres de Tunis" and "Banque Centrale de Tunisie".
- Financial market.
- Definition.
- Financial assets.
- The financial risk.
- The financial risk feature.
- Type of financial risk.
- Risk and volatilit.
- The risk measurement.
- The risk premium.
- The market risk premium.
- Methods proposed for calculating the market risk premium.
- The Market risk premium: BVMT case.
- Data.
- Models used to estimate market risk premium.
«In the first part of our paper we will present the theoretical background of the
international trade. We will begin with the description of the evolution of the
comparative advantage theories, and then continue with the competitive...» Document abstract
$9.95
economics
presentation
date published
27/11/2006
review : not yet assessed
level : Expert
requested 41 times
In the first part of our paper we will present the theoretical background of the
international trade. We will begin with the description of the evolution of the
comparative advantage theories, and then continue with the competitive advantage
theory.
On this point it is important to mention that the authors of the paper which was
the basis for our paper are the opinion that the Chinese Miracle can be best
explained with the term competitiveness (coming from the competitive advantage
theory), so in their paper they only briefly mentioned the comparative advantage
theories and discuss the competitiveness more thoroughly. However, the analysis of
the international trade begun with comparative advantage theories (Smiths theory of
absolute advantage) and there are still many economists claiming that the
development of the East Asia can be explained sufficiently enough by them.
Therefore, we found it sensible to include them in our paper.
We will continue with the discussion of some important factors, responsible
for Chinas competitiveness. We will briefly stop at Balassas comparative
advantages, which are an ex-post measure, to show where China has comparative
advantages. Continuing with exchange rate well try to argue weather its currency is
undervalued, what are the main reasons for such a belief and provide the opposite side
arguing why it is not so. In pursuit of the answer well use different theoretical
background, mainly purchasing power parity and unit value ratios. Next important
factor of Chinas competitiveness are the labour costs, which are determined largely
by the wages.
After that, we will talk about Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in China which
is also used as a measure of China`s competitiveness. We will show that FDI into
China has dramatically risen during recent years- a sign of growing competitiveness
for our authors. But we will also assess this statement critically before we conclude.
- Advantage theories.
- The beginnings of advantage theories.
- Ricardo´s theory of competitive advantage.
- The Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O), theory of factor.
- The H-O theory and the Dornbusch,fisher.
- Further development of advantage theory.
- C ompetitiveness theory.
- Porter´s competitive advantage approach (1990).
- Measuring the competitiveness and the criticism.
- Revealed comparative advantage.
- Exchange rate.
- Determinants of competitiveness.
- Revealed comparative advantage.
- The exchange rate.
- Labour costs.
- Foreign direct investment.
«Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) have a very special place in contemporary economics and finance. They represent the entrance on a deep and liquid market with access to almost unlimited reserves of capital from all over the world. But IPOs appear...» Document abstract
$9.95
finance
presentation
date published
23/11/2006
review : not yet assessed
level : Expert
requested 53 times
Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) have a very special place in contemporary economics and finance. They represent the entrance on a deep and liquid market with access to almost unlimited reserves of capital from all over the world. But IPOs appear also as a short-term fund-raising tool, especially used during the high tech bubble of the late 1990s from new, innovative and invincible-looking start-up companies from the Silicon Valley. In those years, investment bankers (who set up IPOs for the companies going public) thrived and were sacred kings of capitalism by The Economist. Since then, the euphoria vanished but IPOs continued at a respectable pace.
Between 1980 and 2001, the number of IPOs in the US exceeded one per business day. The distribution was not equal: in 1999 and 2000 alone, 900 companies went public. What is more, the IPO business has reached global importance, raising $167 billion around the world in 2005 with 1537 operations. During the period 1998-2004, North America represented 27% of the global market, Europe, Africa and the Middle East combined 42% and Asia-Pacific 31%. The trends of globalization are thus reflecting on the IPO business worldwide: dominance of the US market (on a country basis comparison) and rise of East Asia (especially China).
In a system dominated by market financing, flotation appears often to be a mandatory step in the life of a company above a certain size. We do not discuss in this paper IPOs under this perspective of structural necessity; rather we question the short-term stakes of going public. Besides the strategic choice to be listed on the stock market, what are the immediate objectives of an IPO? It has certainly become, especially since the internet bubble, a corporate financing tool, along with private equity and mergers and acquisitions, aimed at raising funds in a short period of time. Thus, we consider here IPOs under this aspect of short-term financing, even if it has obviously much broader implications.
We can define the objectives of an IPO for a company as follows: raise the maximum value possible through the flotation, and assure a stable and, if possible, increasing price in the aftermarket. The second objective depends partly on the first one, which is basically the direct result of the sale price. Setting the price of the stock to be traded publicly is the greatest challenge in the IPO process, as it determines the equity allocation among investors and the subsequent trading price on the market. Financial theories give no final answer as to what method is the best. Hence the perpetuation of the academic debate.
We have chosen to envision IPOs, the challenges they pose to efficient markets and the theoretical answers to those, through game theory. This approach allows us to detect where inefficiencies occur, what the different motivations of the actors involved are and what possible solutions have been proposed and tested. Game theory appears to us as the best tool to study market inefficiencies by offering a special opportunity to have a critical outlook on market mechanisms and the effects of strategic interaction upon them.
Therefore, we will first present the challenges which IPOs pose to efficient markets (section one). Then we will detail an alternative mechanism for setting the price in an IPO process auctions: what are their advantages and drawbacks (section 2)? Finally, we will study the flotation of EDF, one of the greatest IPOs in the world in the last years, a rare example of overpricing and also a subject of polemics in France (section 3).
Between 1980 and 2001, the number of IPOs in the US exceeded one per business day. The distribution was not equal: in 1999 and 2000 alone, 900 companies went public. What is more, the IPO business has reached global importance, raising $167 billion around the world in 2005 with 1537 operations. During the period 1998-2004, North America represented 27% of the global market, Europe, Africa and the Middle East combined 42% and Asia-Pacific 31%. The trends of globalization are thus reflecting on the IPO business worldwide: dominance of the US market (on a country basis comparison) and rise of East Asia (especially China).
In a system dominated by market financing, flotation appears often to be a mandatory step in the life of a company above a certain size. We do not discuss in this paper IPOs under this perspective of structural necessity; rather we question the short-term stakes of going public. Besides the strategic choice to be listed on the stock market, what are the immediate objectives of an IPO? It has certainly become, especially since the internet bubble, a corporate financing tool, along with private equity and mergers and acquisitions, aimed at raising funds in a short period of time. Thus, we consider here IPOs under this aspect of short-term financing, even if it has obviously much broader implications.
We can define the objectives of an IPO for a company as follows: raise the maximum value possible through the flotation, and assure a stable and, if possible, increasing price in the aftermarket. The second objective depends partly on the first one, which is basically the direct result of the sale price. Setting the price of the stock to be traded publicly is the greatest challenge in the IPO process, as it determines the equity allocation among investors and the subsequent trading price on the market. Financial theories give no final answer as to what method is the best. Hence the perpetuation of the academic debate.
We have chosen to envision IPOs, the challenges they pose to efficient markets and the theoretical answers to those, through game theory. This approach allows us to detect where inefficiencies occur, what the different motivations of the actors involved are and what possible solutions have been proposed and tested. Game theory appears to us as the best tool to study market inefficiencies by offering a special opportunity to have a critical outlook on market mechanisms and the effects of strategic interaction upon them.
Therefore, we will first present the challenges which IPOs pose to efficient markets (section one). Then we will detail an alternative mechanism for setting the price in an IPO process auctions: what are their advantages and drawbacks (section 2)? Finally, we will study the flotation of EDF, one of the greatest IPOs in the world in the last years, a rare example of overpricing and also a subject of polemics in France (section 3).
- IPOs and challenges to market efficiency
- IPOs and the Issue of Information
- Distortion mechanisms and waste of value through underpricing
- The key role of investment banks
- The auction model for setting the price: a viable alternative ?
- The main features of the auction model
- Game theory and auctions
- An illustration with Googles IPO
- A case sStudy of EDFs IPO
- Main characteristics of the state-initiated offer
- Winners and losers in EDFs IPO
- Lessons from the IPO: the case for overpricing?
«The main theme of this project is the facilitation and development of microfinance, which is the provision of loans, savings, insurance, payments, and other basic financial services to low-income populations .
The project is dedicated to...» Document abstract
$8.95
finance
presentation
date published
15/11/2006
review : not yet assessed
level : Expert
requested 12 times
The main theme of this project is the facilitation and development of microfinance, which is the provision of loans, savings, insurance, payments, and other basic financial services to low-income populations .
The project is dedicated to identifying and evaluating existing options for microfinance institutions (MFIs) who wish to access the funds necessary to take advantage of the huge potential market for microfinance. This topic is particularly important as the current lack of funds remains the major growth constraint for the microfinance industry.
Global capital markets would enable MFIs to raise capital for lower rates and longer terms than local financing. Ways for MFIs to access global capital markets are therefore explored in details. The following three sources of commercial financing are then outlined and evaluated in the context of MFIs: bonds, securitization and (quasi-)equity.
However, although microfinance can be profitable, investors remain reluctant to invest in MFIs. We identify the main concerns preventing substantial investment in this area as: concerns over the inadequate risk-return profile, a lack of expertise or experience in the area, operational problems such as pricing, liquidity and legal issues and the perception of microfinance primarily as a form of charity. We then propose ways to deal with these concerns and promote investment in microfinance.
We demonstrate not only how microfinance can offer a relatively low level of systematic risk through its low volatility and weak correlation with political and economic events, but also how it offers a good opportunity for diversification. After showing certain comparability between investments in venture capital and microfinance, we suggest targeting venture capital investors as a priority in gaining access to equity capital.
Having explored and concentrated on the financial aspects of microfinance, we then remind the reader of huge benefits it represents in terms of poverty reduction in under-developed countries.
We conclude by mentioning some further challenges faced by microfinance, such as risk hedging, especially in the context of exchange rate risk, and achieving the three factors that determine a countrys ability to manage microfinance efficiently: political stability, economic security and cultural readiness.
The project is dedicated to identifying and evaluating existing options for microfinance institutions (MFIs) who wish to access the funds necessary to take advantage of the huge potential market for microfinance. This topic is particularly important as the current lack of funds remains the major growth constraint for the microfinance industry.
Global capital markets would enable MFIs to raise capital for lower rates and longer terms than local financing. Ways for MFIs to access global capital markets are therefore explored in details. The following three sources of commercial financing are then outlined and evaluated in the context of MFIs: bonds, securitization and (quasi-)equity.
However, although microfinance can be profitable, investors remain reluctant to invest in MFIs. We identify the main concerns preventing substantial investment in this area as: concerns over the inadequate risk-return profile, a lack of expertise or experience in the area, operational problems such as pricing, liquidity and legal issues and the perception of microfinance primarily as a form of charity. We then propose ways to deal with these concerns and promote investment in microfinance.
We demonstrate not only how microfinance can offer a relatively low level of systematic risk through its low volatility and weak correlation with political and economic events, but also how it offers a good opportunity for diversification. After showing certain comparability between investments in venture capital and microfinance, we suggest targeting venture capital investors as a priority in gaining access to equity capital.
Having explored and concentrated on the financial aspects of microfinance, we then remind the reader of huge benefits it represents in terms of poverty reduction in under-developed countries.
We conclude by mentioning some further challenges faced by microfinance, such as risk hedging, especially in the context of exchange rate risk, and achieving the three factors that determine a countrys ability to manage microfinance efficiently: political stability, economic security and cultural readiness.
- Accessing the Global Capital Markets
- Financing Environment
- Bond Market
- Securitization
- Equity and Quasi-equity
- Overcoming the limitations of the current financing model
- Addressing investorâs main concerns
- The attractiveness of the risk-return profile
- Attracting equity investors
- Social return: a new dimension to investment
«The Washington Consensus has been dead for years, said the World Bank President James D. Wolfensohn at the opening of a conference on Scaling up Poverty Reduction in Shanghai on 25 May, 2004. Its been replaced by all sorts of other...» Document abstract
$9.95
economics
presentation
date published
29/08/2006
review : not yet assessed
level : Expert
requested 7 times
The Washington Consensus has been dead for years, said the World Bank President James D. Wolfensohn at the opening of a conference on Scaling up Poverty Reduction in Shanghai on 25 May, 2004. Its been replaced by all sorts of other consensuses. But today were approaching our discussions with no consensuses, he added. More surprising than the content of the message is the messenger. Indeed the Washington Consensus has been the core of many debates and a controversial subject for a few years. So the fact that, once again, it can be condemned is not that surprising. Yet the fact that the President of the World Bank himself declares the death of the Washington Consensus is much more remarkable. In fact, this is what gives value to this declaration. The implications are twofold: first, it means that he acknowledges that the Washington Consensus did exist, and more, that it is no longer significant. However it seems that the current situation is less obvious than James Wolfensohn presumes. Obviously this particular way of thinking about the development has been more and more criticized over the past few years. Its failures have been more and more apparent. Its functioning has been denounced in reference to its lack of transparency, but also its lack of legitimacy. Its whole philosophy has been less and less accepted by a range of actors as broad as NGOs, citizens movements in the developing world and even some people in developed countries. Yet, at the same time, the Washington Consensus has not fully disappeared and its death cannot be completely proclaimed. Indeed, some evidence shows that its end is relative since some of its policies are still inspired by the recommendations of the IMF and the World Bank and that these representative institutions are still strong and dominant.
What is the situation now? Are we facing a post Washington Consensus area? Or are we still under the neo-liberal domination? What evidence could make us understand the current state of the development policies? To what extent is the Washington Consensus dead?
In order to better understand this controversy, I will first describe the origins and the principles of the Washington Consensus. Next, I will present the evidence that demonstrates the disbanding of this way of thinking and what could possibly be the new paradigm in terms of development policies. I will finally present some limitations that illustrate the continued existence of the Washington Consensus.
What is the situation now? Are we facing a post Washington Consensus area? Or are we still under the neo-liberal domination? What evidence could make us understand the current state of the development policies? To what extent is the Washington Consensus dead?
In order to better understand this controversy, I will first describe the origins and the principles of the Washington Consensus. Next, I will present the evidence that demonstrates the disbanding of this way of thinking and what could possibly be the new paradigm in terms of development policies. I will finally present some limitations that illustrate the continued existence of the Washington Consensus.
- The reign of the Washington Consensus.
- The manifestations of the post neo-liberal era.
- The principles of the `Post Washington Consensus` and its limitations.
«Two years ago, the European Union was joined by 10 new members whose 8 were former communist countries (plus Malta and Cyprus). The fifth enlargement has been the most ambitious in the history of the European Union. It was the largest ever in terms...» Document abstract
$9.95
economics
presentation
date published
21/08/2006
review : not yet assessed
level : General public
requested 14 times
Two years ago, the European Union was joined by 10 new members whose 8 were former communist countries (plus Malta and Cyprus). The fifth enlargement has been the most ambitious in the history of the European Union. It was the largest ever in terms of number of countries (10) and population (75 million) acceding to the European Union. It was the most challenging in terms of disparity of wealth. Achieving the politic and economic reunification of Europe 15 years after the fall of the Berlin wall, it was the most symbolic since the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community which had achieved the French-German reconciliation.
Nevertheless, Eurobarometers showed this strongly symbolic enlargement meet a true enthusiasm neither in old members nor in new comers. Instead, the debate between pros and cons has been mainly situated at the economic level. Western Europeans mainly feared that the enlargement would cause industry outsourcing and Eastern workers immigration and thus raise unemployment in Western Europe. Many thought that the enlargement would come at a huge cost for the EU budget or would reduce the EU subsidiaries, including the CAP, they benefited from. Have these initial fears been fulfilled? On the other hand, the pros claimed that the enlargement would boost economy in both old and new members and that the European integration would accelerate the catching-up process and thus decrease the risk of outsourcing. What do the trends reveal two years later? In the context of high unemployment and lowest economic growth in Western Europe than outside, the political and symbolic dimension of the fifth enlargement was of little concern.
Although I considered this political and symbolic dimension at least as much important as the economic one, it would be impossible to analyze all the aspects of the 2004 enlargement exhaustively in just 15 pages. This paper is consequently focused only on the economic results of the enlargement (what is still too ambitious in 15 pages!). That can seem to be premature only two years after the enlargement. Of course, it is. Economic results should be studied in the long run. On the other hand, we need to analyze intermediate results and current trends not only to better the economic integration of the 2004 new members but also in the perspective of the next enlargement: the adhesion of Romania and Bulgaria in 2007 or 2008.
Has the 2004 enlargement boosted the EU-15s and/or new member states economies? Were Western Europeans initial fears justified actually? Has the EU-15 paid the bill for Eastern and Central European economic success?
Nevertheless, Eurobarometers showed this strongly symbolic enlargement meet a true enthusiasm neither in old members nor in new comers. Instead, the debate between pros and cons has been mainly situated at the economic level. Western Europeans mainly feared that the enlargement would cause industry outsourcing and Eastern workers immigration and thus raise unemployment in Western Europe. Many thought that the enlargement would come at a huge cost for the EU budget or would reduce the EU subsidiaries, including the CAP, they benefited from. Have these initial fears been fulfilled? On the other hand, the pros claimed that the enlargement would boost economy in both old and new members and that the European integration would accelerate the catching-up process and thus decrease the risk of outsourcing. What do the trends reveal two years later? In the context of high unemployment and lowest economic growth in Western Europe than outside, the political and symbolic dimension of the fifth enlargement was of little concern.
Although I considered this political and symbolic dimension at least as much important as the economic one, it would be impossible to analyze all the aspects of the 2004 enlargement exhaustively in just 15 pages. This paper is consequently focused only on the economic results of the enlargement (what is still too ambitious in 15 pages!). That can seem to be premature only two years after the enlargement. Of course, it is. Economic results should be studied in the long run. On the other hand, we need to analyze intermediate results and current trends not only to better the economic integration of the 2004 new members but also in the perspective of the next enlargement: the adhesion of Romania and Bulgaria in 2007 or 2008.
Has the 2004 enlargement boosted the EU-15s and/or new member states economies? Were Western Europeans initial fears justified actually? Has the EU-15 paid the bill for Eastern and Central European economic success?
- The challenging fifth enlargement has undeniably boosted new comer's economies.
- The fifth enlargement was a challenge.
- Two years later, an economic success?.
- Has Western Europe paid the bill for eastern and central European economic growth?.
- Western fears were not justified.
- A small impact on the EU's economy and budget.
The political influence on organization decision making towards corporate social responsability: a socio economic approach
«This research will look at the political influence on organization decision making towards social responsibility. To do so, a combination of social and economic theories will be used. In chapter three, the political field and the political...» Document abstract
$9.95
economics
presentation
date published
27/07/2006
review : not yet assessed
level : Expert
requested 51 times
This research will look at the political influence on organization decision making towards social responsibility. To do so, a combination of social and economic theories will be used. In chapter three, the political field and the political actors in this research will be discussed. Chapter four will describe how organizations can be influenced by the political actors introduced in chapter three. At the background of this relation is the globalization. In chapter three and four will be shown how globalization led to new relations between the different actors and the rise of large international Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs). When the different influences of governments and NGOs on organization decision-making are known, there will be examined how organizations deal with this influence. At the end of this paper, in chapter five, an overview will be given of this possible organizational movements. At last, some hypothesis will be posted towards in which situation organizations make movements towards or away from corporate social responsible behavior.
- Research design
- Objects of research
- Acknowledgement
- The political field around csr
- Introduction
- The impact of globalization
- Different actors: ngos and governments
- The working of the field
- The dependency of organizations
- Introduction
- The impact of globalisation
- The influence of ngos and governments
- Position of csr decision making in the political field
«For several reasons, knowledge cannot be treated like any other commodity. One of these reasons is the nonrivalrous nature of knowledge, which means that one persons use of certain knowledge does not diminish another persons use of the same...» Document abstract
$9.95
economics
theses
date published
27/07/2006
review : not yet assessed
level : Expert
requested 33 times
For several reasons, knowledge cannot be treated like any other commodity. One of these reasons is the nonrivalrous nature of knowledge, which means that one persons use of certain knowledge does not diminish another persons use of the same knowledge (at the same time). This important property of knowledge is used in several early models of R&D-based growth1,
e.g. Romer (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991), and Aghion and Howitt (1992). In these models this property leads to a scale effect, which boils down to larger economies growing faster than smaller economies (with the measure of size suitably defined (cf. Backus, Kehoe and Kehoe 1992)).
In an influential paper, Jones (1995a) pointed out that growth with scale effects, as predicted
by the early models of R&D-based growth, is inconsistent with empirical facts. Over the last
40 years the OECD countries have experienced a tremendous rise in the number of people involved in R&D activities whereas the growth rates of per-capita income have shown no corresponding increase. This is a puzzling observation and has led to new models of R&D- based growth that did not incorporate scale effects e.g. Jones (1995b), Smulders and van de Klundert (1995), Young (1998), Li (2000), and Peretto and Smulders (2002).
Generally, however, these models suffer from the Solow critique; Solow (1994) criticizes
(some) growth theorists because they often just insert favorable assumptions in an unearned way; and then when they put in their thumb and pull out the vary plum they have inserted, there is a tendency to think that something has been proved. (p. 53). In the models
of growth without scale effects the prediction of a scale effects in growth of the early models
of R&D-based growth is removed by limiting the extent of the spillovers associated with knowledges nonrivalrousness, but often the much-needed (micro-)economic foundation for
the crucial assumption in these models regarding the extent of knowledge spillovers - and the
mechanism limiting their extent - is lacking. Assuming that knowledge is rivalrous (not nonrivalrous) to limit spillovers and dispose of the scale effects prediction of the early models
of R&D-based growth simply does not shed much light on the issue of growth without scale effects however.
provide background information regarding, amongst others, work discussed in the main text, data used in figures, etc.
e.g. Romer (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991), and Aghion and Howitt (1992). In these models this property leads to a scale effect, which boils down to larger economies growing faster than smaller economies (with the measure of size suitably defined (cf. Backus, Kehoe and Kehoe 1992)).
In an influential paper, Jones (1995a) pointed out that growth with scale effects, as predicted
by the early models of R&D-based growth, is inconsistent with empirical facts. Over the last
40 years the OECD countries have experienced a tremendous rise in the number of people involved in R&D activities whereas the growth rates of per-capita income have shown no corresponding increase. This is a puzzling observation and has led to new models of R&D- based growth that did not incorporate scale effects e.g. Jones (1995b), Smulders and van de Klundert (1995), Young (1998), Li (2000), and Peretto and Smulders (2002).
Generally, however, these models suffer from the Solow critique; Solow (1994) criticizes
(some) growth theorists because they often just insert favorable assumptions in an unearned way; and then when they put in their thumb and pull out the vary plum they have inserted, there is a tendency to think that something has been proved. (p. 53). In the models
of growth without scale effects the prediction of a scale effects in growth of the early models
of R&D-based growth is removed by limiting the extent of the spillovers associated with knowledges nonrivalrousness, but often the much-needed (micro-)economic foundation for
the crucial assumption in these models regarding the extent of knowledge spillovers - and the
mechanism limiting their extent - is lacking. Assuming that knowledge is rivalrous (not nonrivalrous) to limit spillovers and dispose of the scale effects prediction of the early models
of R&D-based growth simply does not shed much light on the issue of growth without scale effects however.
provide background information regarding, amongst others, work discussed in the main text, data used in figures, etc.
- Grouth and scale effects
- Knowledge, R&D and spilovers, at the firm
- Grouth without scale effects and structural
- Measurement issues in the study of R&D-based
- The product life cycle, demand
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