«The last half of the 20th Century has been exclusively dominated by the Cold war conflict. There was little space in the analysis of the scholars in International relations for other minor issues of “low politics”, while the questions of the nuclear...» Document abstract
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international relations
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15/01/2007
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Summary The last half of the 20th Century has been exclusively dominated by the Cold war conflict. There was little space in the analysis of the scholars in International relations for other minor issues of “low politics”, while the questions of the nuclear war and balance of terror dominated the studies of world politics. Although international agreements have been signed for about a century, “the environment was simply regarded as the unchanging context of international politics.” The first change occurred in the late 60s early 1970s, from a public awareness of environmental degradation due to the industrial activity. This emergence of the ecologic sensibility was translated by the creation of lobbying groups such as Greenpeace, and political parties around the Western world. But the real change in that respect was corollary to the end of the cold war. The collapse of the USSR put a temporary end to the major threat of the time, the nuclear war. New threats and a new definition of security then appeared in the study of International relations, challenging the old realist theories. These attempts to redefine concepts such as security or threat will be studied in the first part, as it is a key to understand how environment can be a security issue. There are several fashions in which environmental issues can represent international threats, and that is the focus of the second part.
Table of Contents- Attempts to redefine concepts such as security or threat
- Several fashions in which environmental issues can represent international threats
«The Second Yugoslavia created in 1943, under the name of Democratic Federation of Yugoslavia, was a federal state consisting of six republics -Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia- and two autonomous provinces -...» Document abstract
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international relations
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date published
20/12/2006
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SummaryThe Second Yugoslavia created in 1943, under the name of Democratic Federation of Yugoslavia, was a federal state consisting of six republics -Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia- and two autonomous provinces - Kosovo and Vojvodina. It became the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia in 1946 and then the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1963. This federation broke up in the early 1990s when Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence on June 25, 1991, followed by Macedonia in October and Bosnia Herzegovina in November. What explains this disintegration? It is impossible to reduce “the complexity of socialist Yugoslav disintegration to some supposed pre-eminent factor. On the contrary, economics choices, institutional structures, religious cultures, elite dynamics, and deficiencies in system legitimacy all played a role in pushing the country toward violent break-up”. Indeed, “the disintegration of Yugoslavia had many causes, not a single one”. Yugoslavia was a mosaic of ethnic groups, whose unity was undermined by Tito’s death, economic crisis, ethnic tensions, changing international context and the rise of nationalism in the 1980s.
Table of Contents- Creation in 1943 of the Second Yugoslavia
- A mosaic of ethnic groups, languages and religions which made unity difficult.
- The deaths of Vice-president Edvard Kardelj in 1979 and President Tito in 1980 deprived the country of imposing unity.
«Located at a strategic position in the eastern Mediterranean sea, Cyprus, in the course of its history has frequently switched hands in-between powers which maintained an interest in the region. The list of its successive rulers includes the...» Document abstract
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international relations
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14/12/2006
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SummaryLocated at a strategic position in the eastern Mediterranean sea, Cyprus, in the course of its history has frequently switched hands in-between powers which maintained an interest in the region. The list of its successive rulers includes the Egyptians, the Greeks, the Phoenicians, the Byzantines, the Venetians, the Ottoman Turks, and finally before the1960 declaration of independence, the British.
Amidst all of these populations only two of them had a significant impact on the demographic structure of the Cypriot society. The Greeks, which settled on the island during the second millennium B.C, and the Turks, which sat foot on Cyprus during the period of the Ottoman empire, when, in 1571, the armies of Lala Mustapha seized Famagusta, last city to resist them on the island. Cyprus remained under Ottoman rule until the congress of Berlin in 1878 where it was ceded to Britain. The terms of the agreement stipulated that Britain was to occupy and administer the island in exchange of a promise to help Turkey defend itself against Russia if need arose. In 1914, after Turkey had joined forces with the Central powers, Britain unilaterally declared the 1878 convention null and annexed Cyprus. This illegal (in face of international law) situation was resolved by the Lausanne treaty of 1923 which stipulated that Turkey recognized ab initio (from the 5th of November 1914) the British annexation of Cyprus.
In recent history, the Cyprus problem has gone through three phases while we are now (with the probable acceptance of Cypriot membership in the EU) probably witnessing the beginning of a fourth one. From 1923 until 1960 it was mainly a colonial issue. From 1960 to 1974 the problem became an internal one, in which external powers where involved. These powers where Greece, Turkey, Britain and (although the importance of superpower involvement has been cited quite many times) to a lesser extent the USA and the Soviet Union. After the Turkish invasion of 1974, the Cypriot problem has revolved over the de facto partition of the island and the illegal proclamation of the TRNC. (Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus) in 1983 which has been condemned by UN resolution 541.
In this paper I will be mostly focusing on the first and second time periods. More precisely I will try to find the psychological causes of the ethnic violence that first erupted in 1963. In order to do so I will shortly present a number of theories which might explain the causes of conflict and I will try to show the elements in the history of Cyprus that enable us to point to these theories (or to refute them) as an explanation of the communal violence. Alternative, non psychological, explanations of this conflict will also very shortly be presented, and as a conclusion, a short assessment (deriving from the paper) of the analytical strength of both types of explanations will be presented.
Amidst all of these populations only two of them had a significant impact on the demographic structure of the Cypriot society. The Greeks, which settled on the island during the second millennium B.C, and the Turks, which sat foot on Cyprus during the period of the Ottoman empire, when, in 1571, the armies of Lala Mustapha seized Famagusta, last city to resist them on the island. Cyprus remained under Ottoman rule until the congress of Berlin in 1878 where it was ceded to Britain. The terms of the agreement stipulated that Britain was to occupy and administer the island in exchange of a promise to help Turkey defend itself against Russia if need arose. In 1914, after Turkey had joined forces with the Central powers, Britain unilaterally declared the 1878 convention null and annexed Cyprus. This illegal (in face of international law) situation was resolved by the Lausanne treaty of 1923 which stipulated that Turkey recognized ab initio (from the 5th of November 1914) the British annexation of Cyprus.
In recent history, the Cyprus problem has gone through three phases while we are now (with the probable acceptance of Cypriot membership in the EU) probably witnessing the beginning of a fourth one. From 1923 until 1960 it was mainly a colonial issue. From 1960 to 1974 the problem became an internal one, in which external powers where involved. These powers where Greece, Turkey, Britain and (although the importance of superpower involvement has been cited quite many times) to a lesser extent the USA and the Soviet Union. After the Turkish invasion of 1974, the Cypriot problem has revolved over the de facto partition of the island and the illegal proclamation of the TRNC. (Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus) in 1983 which has been condemned by UN resolution 541.
In this paper I will be mostly focusing on the first and second time periods. More precisely I will try to find the psychological causes of the ethnic violence that first erupted in 1963. In order to do so I will shortly present a number of theories which might explain the causes of conflict and I will try to show the elements in the history of Cyprus that enable us to point to these theories (or to refute them) as an explanation of the communal violence. Alternative, non psychological, explanations of this conflict will also very shortly be presented, and as a conclusion, a short assessment (deriving from the paper) of the analytical strength of both types of explanations will be presented.
Table of Contents- Psychological causes of conflict
- Suitable targets of externalisation
- Misperceptions of intentions
- Psycho-cultural interpretations
- Social identity theory
- Incompatible beliefs
- Non psychological explanations of the conflict
«Through the process of critical oral history, Robert McNamara has re-evaluated his experience as the Secretary of Defense under the Kennedy and Johnson presidencies. Filmmaker Errol Morris shaped his documentary The Fog of War around eleven lessons...» Document abstract
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Language : english
international relations
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date published
29/11/2006
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SummaryThrough the process of critical oral history, Robert McNamara has re-evaluated his experience as the Secretary of Defense under the Kennedy and Johnson presidencies. Filmmaker Errol Morris shaped his documentary The Fog of War around eleven lessons from the life of McNamara. The first two lessons are “Empathize with your enemy” and “Rationality will not save us.” They are useful to think about for future foreign policy making, even though they have limits. The contemporary issue of terrorism shows how applicable the lessons are.
In the documentary The Fog of War, Robert McNamara gives a clear definition of empathy: “We must try to put ourselves inside their [our enemies’] skin and look at us through their eyes, just to understand the thoughts that lie behind their decisions and their actions.” Empathy is different from sympathy; it does not imply having feelings, but rather it implies understanding the thoughts and feelings of one’s enemy (Ralph K. White). R. White goes further by stating that decision-makers are wrong when they do not see their opponents’ fear, anger, and longing for peace .
The Cuban Missile Crisis is the best-known case of empathy. In 1962, U.S. foreign policy makers did not trust Khrushchev. On October 26 and 27, the Kennedy administration received two letters from the Soviet leader: first a private letter offering the removal of Soviet missiles in Cuba in exchange for a U.S. promise of non-invasion of Cuba, then a public letter adding the removal of U.S. missiles in Turkey to the deal. Kennedy concluded that the public letter was the official position of USSR. He felt that the Soviets were likely to attack the U.S. missiles in Turkey if they were not satisfied by the American response. The only member of the ExComm who dared contradicting the President was Llewellyn “Tommy” Thompson, former U.S. Ambassador to Moscow. Thompson, who had lived close to Khrushchev in Moscow, perceived that the Soviet leader was willing to avoid a conflict. He said to Kennedy: “The important thing for Khrushchev, it seems to me, is to be able to say: ‘I saved Cuba. I stopped an invasion.’” Thompson was right; President Kennedy responded to the private letter, and a nuclear war was avoided. After the crisis, the two countries reached the conclusion that more communication and understanding was necessary; therefore, the Hotline linking the White House with the Kremlin was established in 1963. During a discussion in Cambridge in 1987, Robert McNamara learned that the Soviet missiles had been deployed in Cuba because of the fear of an imminent U.S. invasion of Cuba. Twenty-five years later, it was still hard for the former Soviet decision-makers to believe that the United States had no plan to invade Cuba after the Bay of Pigs fiasco. The Soviets, as well as the Americans, had failed to occupy their enemy’s mindset.
In the documentary The Fog of War, Robert McNamara gives a clear definition of empathy: “We must try to put ourselves inside their [our enemies’] skin and look at us through their eyes, just to understand the thoughts that lie behind their decisions and their actions.” Empathy is different from sympathy; it does not imply having feelings, but rather it implies understanding the thoughts and feelings of one’s enemy (Ralph K. White). R. White goes further by stating that decision-makers are wrong when they do not see their opponents’ fear, anger, and longing for peace .
The Cuban Missile Crisis is the best-known case of empathy. In 1962, U.S. foreign policy makers did not trust Khrushchev. On October 26 and 27, the Kennedy administration received two letters from the Soviet leader: first a private letter offering the removal of Soviet missiles in Cuba in exchange for a U.S. promise of non-invasion of Cuba, then a public letter adding the removal of U.S. missiles in Turkey to the deal. Kennedy concluded that the public letter was the official position of USSR. He felt that the Soviets were likely to attack the U.S. missiles in Turkey if they were not satisfied by the American response. The only member of the ExComm who dared contradicting the President was Llewellyn “Tommy” Thompson, former U.S. Ambassador to Moscow. Thompson, who had lived close to Khrushchev in Moscow, perceived that the Soviet leader was willing to avoid a conflict. He said to Kennedy: “The important thing for Khrushchev, it seems to me, is to be able to say: ‘I saved Cuba. I stopped an invasion.’” Thompson was right; President Kennedy responded to the private letter, and a nuclear war was avoided. After the crisis, the two countries reached the conclusion that more communication and understanding was necessary; therefore, the Hotline linking the White House with the Kremlin was established in 1963. During a discussion in Cambridge in 1987, Robert McNamara learned that the Soviet missiles had been deployed in Cuba because of the fear of an imminent U.S. invasion of Cuba. Twenty-five years later, it was still hard for the former Soviet decision-makers to believe that the United States had no plan to invade Cuba after the Bay of Pigs fiasco. The Soviets, as well as the Americans, had failed to occupy their enemy’s mindset.
Table of Contents- Lesson One: 'Empathize with Your Enemy?
- Lesson Two: 'Rationality Will Not Save Us?
- Contemporary Foreign Policy Issue: Terrorism
«In 1898, the United States intervened in the Caribbean and Pacific to fight against Spanish imperialism. In the aftermath of the Spanish-American War, the United States occupied Cuba from January 1899 to May 1902. On February 25, 1901, Senator...» Document abstract
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Language : english
international relations
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date published
29/11/2006
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SummaryIn 1898, the United States intervened in the Caribbean and Pacific to fight against Spanish imperialism. In the aftermath of the Spanish-American War, the United States occupied Cuba from January 1899 to May 1902. On February 25, 1901, Senator Orville H. Platt introduced in Congress “the famous amendment that bears his name” (Aguilar 1972), which shaped the American intervention in Cuban affairs. It also proposed the creation of an American naval base in Cuba. The bill became law on March 2. In spite of a strong opposition in the country, Cuba conceded that a restricted independence was better than a military regime (Aguilar 1972) and included the amendment in its 1901 Constitution. In 1903, the Lease of Coaling or Naval Stations Agreement Between the United States and Cuba Treaty specified that, in exchange of “the continuance of the ultimate sovereignty of the Republic of Cuba, … the United states shall exercise complete jurisdiction and control over and within said areas” (Treaty Series No. 418). Since then, Guantánamo Bay has been under U.S. control.
Although the Platt Amendment was abrogated by Cuba in 1904, a new agreement was negotiated between the Roosevelt administration and the American-friendly Caffery-Batista-Mendieta government. It kept the “Platt spirit” (Dominguez, Smith 1988) by not changing the status of Guantánamo, “so long as the United States of America shall not abandon the said naval station of Guantanamo or the two Governments shall not agree to a modification of its present limits” (Treaty Series No. 866). Thus, the new Treaty of Relations established a “lease in perpetuity” (Dominguez, Smith 1988).
Since the revolution in 1959, Cuba has wanted to terminate the lease, but it is has not been able to do so without American consent (Ratner, Ray 2004). In opposition to the lease, Fidel Castro has always refused to accept the rent of about $4,085 a year. On October 29, 1962, during the Cuban Missile Crisis, Castro declared that the only effective guarantee “that there will be no aggression against Cuba” would be five points , including the U.S. withdrawal from Guantánamo Naval Base (Blight, Brenner 2004). This request was supported by the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries in its First Summit Conference , held in Belgrade in 1961 (Ricardo Luis 1994), but the movement was not influent enough to change the U.S. foreign policy.
Although the Platt Amendment was abrogated by Cuba in 1904, a new agreement was negotiated between the Roosevelt administration and the American-friendly Caffery-Batista-Mendieta government. It kept the “Platt spirit” (Dominguez, Smith 1988) by not changing the status of Guantánamo, “so long as the United States of America shall not abandon the said naval station of Guantanamo or the two Governments shall not agree to a modification of its present limits” (Treaty Series No. 866). Thus, the new Treaty of Relations established a “lease in perpetuity” (Dominguez, Smith 1988).
Since the revolution in 1959, Cuba has wanted to terminate the lease, but it is has not been able to do so without American consent (Ratner, Ray 2004). In opposition to the lease, Fidel Castro has always refused to accept the rent of about $4,085 a year. On October 29, 1962, during the Cuban Missile Crisis, Castro declared that the only effective guarantee “that there will be no aggression against Cuba” would be five points , including the U.S. withdrawal from Guantánamo Naval Base (Blight, Brenner 2004). This request was supported by the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries in its First Summit Conference , held in Belgrade in 1961 (Ricardo Luis 1994), but the movement was not influent enough to change the U.S. foreign policy.
Table of Contents- Issue background: Guantánamo and the United States since 1898
- Courses of action
- Arguments: why Guantánamo should return to Cuba
«The Czech and the Slovak nations had a similar history for more than a century, and the attempt to coexist in just one common state definitely failed in autumn 1992, when the Czech Prime Minister Václav Klaus and the leader of the main Slovak party...» Document abstract
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Language : english
international relations
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date published
20/09/2006
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SummaryThe Czech and the Slovak nations had a similar history for more than a century, and the attempt to coexist in just one common state definitely failed in autumn 1992, when the Czech Prime Minister Václav Klaus and the leader of the main Slovak party HZDS, Vladimír Meèiar, came to the conclusion that the break-up of the integrated republic would be the best solution to the long-time internal problems. Consequently, on the 1st January 1993 two different countries emerged: the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic.
Today, both of the Republics are members both of NATO and the EU; nevertheless the evolution of the former sibling countries has been slightly different. The Czech Republic’s passage from the period of 40 years of subordination to the USSR into a functional democracy was less painful than the one Slovakia had to go through. The Czechs became members of NATO in 1999, whereas the Slovaks were not incorporated in the first wave of enhancement. Later on, when the negotiation process for the admission of the Czech and Slovak Republics to EU grew near to its end, Slovakia confronted various problems which led to discussions about its preparedness. But finally, both of the countries became members of the EU on the 1st May 2004 during the first wave of enlargement.
When taking into consideration the fact that the two countries had a common past and that they have gone through a long process of self-determination, we may suppose that the evolution of the political positioning of the two countries would also be similar. In spite of all this, we may find today two rather different systems of political culture, of party divisions and also of political struggle in the Czech Republic and Slovak Republic. Today, when talking about the further European enlargement and more about the possible admission of Turkey in the future, the two countries and their respective political parties have distinct points of view. From what is said below it may be possible to conclude that the Czech Republic had a more positive point of view about the European Union and it was more keen on entering it, whereas Slovakia stuck to its long-established good relationships with the USA and orientated its foreign politics rather to the Anglo-Saxon world. Meanwhile it is clear that after entering the EU, both of the former members of Czechoslovakia, who are now independent countries, must have expressed their opinion about the boundaries of the new allied Europe, about the further enlargement, and of course also about the question of Turkey. And surprisingly these opinions have not turned out to as different as expected in the two countries.
Consequently several questions as to why this significant division has happened may emerge: are the systems of political parties already divided by definition (because of different political background, socio-cultural beliefs or values); are there the same differences of opinion regarding the attitude to the EU and also Turkey in the Czech and in the Slovak Republic, or may we also note any internal differences between the two party systems?
Today, both of the Republics are members both of NATO and the EU; nevertheless the evolution of the former sibling countries has been slightly different. The Czech Republic’s passage from the period of 40 years of subordination to the USSR into a functional democracy was less painful than the one Slovakia had to go through. The Czechs became members of NATO in 1999, whereas the Slovaks were not incorporated in the first wave of enhancement. Later on, when the negotiation process for the admission of the Czech and Slovak Republics to EU grew near to its end, Slovakia confronted various problems which led to discussions about its preparedness. But finally, both of the countries became members of the EU on the 1st May 2004 during the first wave of enlargement.
When taking into consideration the fact that the two countries had a common past and that they have gone through a long process of self-determination, we may suppose that the evolution of the political positioning of the two countries would also be similar. In spite of all this, we may find today two rather different systems of political culture, of party divisions and also of political struggle in the Czech Republic and Slovak Republic. Today, when talking about the further European enlargement and more about the possible admission of Turkey in the future, the two countries and their respective political parties have distinct points of view. From what is said below it may be possible to conclude that the Czech Republic had a more positive point of view about the European Union and it was more keen on entering it, whereas Slovakia stuck to its long-established good relationships with the USA and orientated its foreign politics rather to the Anglo-Saxon world. Meanwhile it is clear that after entering the EU, both of the former members of Czechoslovakia, who are now independent countries, must have expressed their opinion about the boundaries of the new allied Europe, about the further enlargement, and of course also about the question of Turkey. And surprisingly these opinions have not turned out to as different as expected in the two countries.
Consequently several questions as to why this significant division has happened may emerge: are the systems of political parties already divided by definition (because of different political background, socio-cultural beliefs or values); are there the same differences of opinion regarding the attitude to the EU and also Turkey in the Czech and in the Slovak Republic, or may we also note any internal differences between the two party systems?
Table of Contents- Political systems: parties and their main ideas.
- The case of the Czech Republic.
- The case of the Slovak Republic.
- Party position regarding the EU and its further enlargement.
- The case of the Czech Republic.
- The case of the Slovak Republic.
- Reason for the party positioning.
«General De Gaulle once said that all alliances are like roses: they wither and decay. NATO might be a counter-example or it might not. While during the Munich Conference, the US Deputy Secretary of Defense, Paul Wolfowitz, claimed “As an alliance we...» Document abstract
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international relations
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date published
29/08/2006
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SummaryGeneral De Gaulle once said that all alliances are like roses: they wither and decay. NATO might be a counter-example or it might not. While during the Munich Conference, the US Deputy Secretary of Defense, Paul Wolfowitz, claimed “As an alliance we have never been stronger. We have never been more united. We have never been more resolved to move forward together,” the general opinion was quite the opposite. On both sides of the Atlantic, no one would say that this statement strongly reflects the current reality. On the contrary, NATO is actually a huge object of controversies and is at a crossroads, trying to define its future, if any. Is NATO still relevant in a world of evolving coalitions and global economies? Is there a place for a military partnership originally formed to counter balance the Soviet Union (USSR) that no longer exists? Will the eternally-fraught transatlantic relationship be the downfall of the most powerful military alliance in the world? In order to understand this debate better, I will first present the framework of the current NATO’s controversy, and then describe the NATO’s advocates’ point of view. I will consequently discuss the fact that, without reforming, NATO is no longer relevant in a post Cold War world.
Table of Contents- General framework around NATO's controversy.
- The arguments of NATO's advocates .
- The increasing irrelevance of NATO.
«To answer the question “Can we have world government”, we must understand two questions: one is “What would be the use and necessity of a world government”; the other one is “In what extent would it be possible?” “A government is a system, form or...» Document abstract
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international relations
presentation
date published
25/07/2006
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level : General public
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SummaryTo answer the question “Can we have world government”, we must understand two questions: one is “What would be the use and necessity of a world government”; the other one is “In what extent would it be possible?” “A government is a system, form or organization by which a community or other political unit is governed” . Does globalization today imply that the world is ready for a supranational organization that would carry the badge “world government”? Indeed, Howard argues that “Gradually, under the pressure of globalization, supranational entities are coming into having the power to override the authority of sovereign states.” Although today's world is getting in some way more and more global (countries more and more interdependent), diversity and inequalities have not yet disappeared, nor are they likely to be in a good way of being eradicated. Considering this, we may wonder whether a world government would help resolve problems such as inequality: would developing countries benefit from it, or would only dominating powers manage to get something out of it? The answer obviously depends on the constitution of this government. There have been
various attempts to build a supranational entity, and each one of them has brought new useful lessons, either good or bad.
Table of Contents- Why we would need a system that would dominate all the people of the world
- The idea of a world citizenship is very attractive, but there are many objections to it
- Attempts to form supranational governments since World War I
«International Politics are based upon two main theories, Realism and Liberalism, which are
conventionally opposed, and therefore give two different interpretations of world politics. This essay will focus on the stances of these theories upon the...» Document abstract
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international relations
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date published
24/07/2006
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level : General public
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SummaryInternational Politics are based upon two main theories, Realism and Liberalism, which are
conventionally opposed, and therefore give two different interpretations of world politics. This essay will focus on the stances of these theories upon the role of the state. But before assessing their viewpoints, it is crucial to understand what the state represents. Already in 1648, the Treaties of Westphalia which ended the Thirty Years War set an international society in which sovereign states possess the monopoly of force within their defined territory and behave among themselves through diplomacy and international law, implying a separation between the domestic and international
spheres. The state is a “distinct set of political institutions whose specific concern is with the
organization of the domination in the name of the common interest, within a delimited territory.”
Besides, Max Weber gives the most influential definition of the modern state: “the state is a human
community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of force within a given territory.”
Table of Contents- Realism theory
- Liberalism therory
Is there a 'responsibility to protect'? Is the UN capable of protecting the victims of internal conflicts?
«Civil wars are, today, since the end of the Cold War, the dominant form of conflicts all around the world. For instance, as Stephen John Stedman explains, 'all thirty-five of the wars in 1997 were primarily internal' . Massive violence, destruction...» Document abstract
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Language : english
international relations
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date published
24/07/2006
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level : General public
requested 2 times
SummaryCivil wars are, today, since the end of the Cold War, the dominant form of conflicts all around the world. For instance, as Stephen John Stedman explains, 'all thirty-five of the wars in 1997 were primarily internal' . Massive violence, destruction and killing tend, so, nowadays, to happen within states borders and no more in an inter-state context. Moreover, empirical studies show us, that among the total casualty figures of internal wars since 1945, the so-called 'wars of the third kind', 'approximately 90% of the casualties were civilians' .
As an international organization whose first purpose is to promote global peace and the respect of human rights, the UN can be expected to intervene in order to protect the victims of these civil wars and to establish peace. But this idea is often undermined by the concept of state sovereignty. There is, so, an important dilemma of how to react to such situations as ethnic cleansing, gross violence and explicit violation of human rights within a nation-state, raising the question of the responsibility of the UN in contrast with the sovereign character of states, their exclusive right to exercise supreme political authority . Is there an existing 'responsibility to protect'? Is the UN capable of protecting the victims of these internal conflicts?
Table of Contents- The UN has not only a right but also a duty to protect the victims of third kind wars
- The various difficulties the organization is facing while trying to fulfil this mission, mostly linked with the concept of sovereignty
- Redefinition of sovereignty in today's world politic context, where the acceptance of humanitarian intervention, rather to go against it, is more a component of it
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