La notion de "position originelle" (original position) chez Rawls induit-elle une théorie de l'individu, ou de l'identité individuelle?

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5 pages word

anglais

philosophie

exposé

publié le 25/07/2008

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Résumé

rawls’ account of the original position is subject to many criticisms from communitarian philosophers. While this account constitutes the very basis from which he derives his theory of justice, it is regarded as being flawed and thus compromises the validity of his whole theory. The criticism focus on the fact that the concept of the original position implies a theory of person, which is, according to the communitarians, a wrong account of human experience. According to them, it namely neglects the extent to which the self is constituted by the social world in which one lives and from which one derives its conception of the good, and of how to live in society. This criticism can be powerful one, since it is able to undermine rawls’s entire theory. Thus the claim that the original position entails a theory of person is to be examined closely. This debate is moreover crucial within political philosophy, as it constitutes the central focus of the communitarian critique of rawls’ Theory of Justice, one fundamental work of contemporary liberal political thinking. So the question of whether the original position described by rawls implies a theory of person takes us to a larger debate which opposes liberal and communitarian views on how one should think the individual and its relation to its society.
The main questioning which arises from this debate is following: does rawls’s account of the original position includes a theory of the person or of personal identity, that is, does it have any metaphysical claim about the self?
We should start by examining in detail rawls’ account of the original position to understand how the individual in this position is viewed, and see what role the original position plays in rawls’ theory. We will then see that the implications of this Rawlsian original position is considered by communitarians as implying a theory of person which greatly differs from the way they consider the individual is constituted. In this part it will also be important to understand how this critics of the theory of the person becomes the central feature of communitarian critics of rawls’ theory of justice, namely in Sandel’s work. Finally, we will study the extent to which this communitarian attack does in fact undermine rawls’ theory of justice.