La politique de conditionnalité de l'Union européenne, relative à la réforme de l'Etat en Bosnie : une relation difficile
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thèse
publié le 02/08/2008
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Résumé
The thesis examines the adequacy of EU conditionality to induce state-building reform in the particular context of Bosnia. The purpose is to analyse whether the conditions set and the incentive offered by the EU are adequate to induce state-building reform. EU conditionality has been largely successful in inducing domestic change in Central and Eastern European
Countries in the previous pre-accession process. The task faced by EU conditionality in Bosnia has however been fundamentally different from the previous pre-accession experience. In fact, the inclusion of Bosnia in the EUs Stabilisation and Association
Process, the framework for the Western Balkans accession to the EU, has overlapped with the countrys state-building process. The unprecedented challenge of EU conditionality has been to provide the political elite of an ethnically divided country with sufficient leverage to induce the reforms necessary to build a viable state. Highlighting Bosnias difficult adoption of EU conditions within the Stabilisation and
Association Process and its reliance on the influence of the High Representative, it appears that the influence of EU conditionality has been weaker than expected in inducing statebuilding reforms. The central argument of the thesis is that this is due to the problematic relationship between EU conditionality and the countrys specificity. The high cost of
adopting sensitive EU conditions which intervene in a contested state-building process combined with the low incentive of long term EU membership, has ultimately weakened the ability of the EU to induce domestic reform in Bosnia. To measure how the specificity of Bosnia has affected its compliance with EU requirements, a theoretical model is drawn upon, which takes into account the particular nature of Bosnia
as a divided state. In order to evaluate the central argument, the example of the police reform is tested against this theoretical framework. The analysis leads to the conclusion that the difficulty in meeting the EU condition for police reform was due to the combination of the high cost of meeting a highly sensitive condition intervening in the essence of divergences about the end goal of the state-building process, with the low incentive of long term EU
membership. Ultimately if the EU is to succeed in the unprecedented challenge of inducing state-building reforms in a divided society like Bosnia, it has to adapt its conditionality accordingly.
Sommaire
- State-building in Bosnia: Rebuilding a Divided Country through Imposition
- The Dayton Constitution: Cementing Division
- Rebuilding a State in a Divided Society: The Need for an Iron Fist
- State-building through the Stabilization and Association Process Conditionality
- The Stabilization and Association Process
- The SAP and Bosnia: an Instrument for State-building and the Way towards Ownership of Reform
- Bosnia's Road towards a Stabilization and Association Agreement
- Unravelling the Relationship between EU Conditionality and Bosnia's Specificity: a Theoretical Framework
- Explaining the Efficiency of EU Conditionality: the General Theoretical Framework
- Explaining the Efficiency of EU Conditionality in Bosnia: the Need for an Adapted Theoretical Framework.
- The Police Reform: Testing EU Conditionality in Bosnia
- Police in Bosnia: A Fragmented System
- Reforming the Police as a Condition for Signing the SAA: a Long and Difficult Path
- The Underlying Reasons of the Adoption Dynamic: Confirming the Theoretical Model?
