« there has been a large movement towards Regional Economic Integration. The first are economic considerations. Integration will allow countries to specialize in ...» Document abstract
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european union
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03/05/2008
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SummaryRegional Economic Integration is the act of cooperating countries entering into agreements with each other to remove all barriers to importing goods into their respective countries. One of the biggest walls to exporting to foreign markets has been tariffs and taxes levied against foreign nations who try to sell their products or services in other countries. Over the past 50 years, there has been a drastic increase in the number of countries that are trying to enter into these types of agreements. In other words, there has been a large movement towards Regional Economic Integration. There are two main arguments that support this integration. The first are economic considerations. Integration will allow countries to specialize in products or services that they are best suited to produce and sell them on a worldwide market without fear of huge barriers to entry into certain markets. This would actually lead to increased production around the world because countries will specialize in what they are good at and not worry about having to produce other things which would take them much longer or were not practical for them to produce at all. These countries know that they will be able to depend on other countries to produce the goods or services they need in exchange for their own specialized products and services. This increased production and specialization should also decrease the prices of things on a worldwide scale because countries will only produce what they are truly good at producing and will not waste time (as well as money) on producing inefficiently.
Key Words- The Single European Act, Obstacles to Integration and United front
Key Words- The Single European Act, Obstacles to Integration and United front
« benefit the most from EU regional aid refuse This has limited the economic integration and the benefits from enlargement has been a true economic success but a ...» Document abstract
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15 word format
Language : english
economics
presentation
date published
21/08/2006
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level : General public
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SummaryTwo years ago, the European Union was joined by 10 new members whose 8 were former communist countries (plus Malta and Cyprus). The fifth enlargement has been the most ambitious in the history of the European Union. It was the largest ever in terms of number of countries (10) and population (75 million) acceding to the European Union. It was the most challenging in terms of disparity of wealth. Achieving the politic and economic reunification of Europe 15 years after the fall of the Berlin wall, it was the most symbolic since the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community which had achieved the French-German reconciliation.
Nevertheless, Eurobarometers showed this strongly symbolic enlargement meet a true enthusiasm neither in old members nor in new comers. Instead, the debate between pros and cons has been mainly situated at the economic level. Western Europeans mainly feared that the enlargement would cause industry outsourcing and Eastern workers’ immigration and thus raise unemployment in Western Europe. Many thought that the enlargement would come at a huge cost for the EU budget or would reduce the EU subsidiaries, including the CAP, they benefited from. Have these initial fears been fulfilled? On the other hand, the pros claimed that the enlargement would boost economy in both old and new members and that the European integration would accelerate the catching-up process and thus decrease the risk of outsourcing. What do the trends reveal two years later? In the context of high unemployment and lowest economic growth in Western Europe than outside, the political and symbolic dimension of the fifth enlargement was of little concern.
Although I considered this political and symbolic dimension at least as much important as the economic one, it would be impossible to analyze all the aspects of the 2004 enlargement exhaustively in just 15 pages. This paper is consequently focused only on the economic results of the enlargement (what is still too ambitious in 15 pages!). That can seem to be premature only two years after the enlargement. Of course, it is. Economic results should be studied in the long run. On the other hand, we need to analyze intermediate results and current trends not only to better the economic integration of the 2004 new members but also in the perspective of the next enlargement: the adhesion of Romania and Bulgaria in 2007 or 2008.
Has the 2004 enlargement boosted the EU-15’s and/or new member states’ economies? Were Western Europeans’ initial fears justified actually? Has the EU-15 paid the bill for Eastern and Central European economic success?
Nevertheless, Eurobarometers showed this strongly symbolic enlargement meet a true enthusiasm neither in old members nor in new comers. Instead, the debate between pros and cons has been mainly situated at the economic level. Western Europeans mainly feared that the enlargement would cause industry outsourcing and Eastern workers’ immigration and thus raise unemployment in Western Europe. Many thought that the enlargement would come at a huge cost for the EU budget or would reduce the EU subsidiaries, including the CAP, they benefited from. Have these initial fears been fulfilled? On the other hand, the pros claimed that the enlargement would boost economy in both old and new members and that the European integration would accelerate the catching-up process and thus decrease the risk of outsourcing. What do the trends reveal two years later? In the context of high unemployment and lowest economic growth in Western Europe than outside, the political and symbolic dimension of the fifth enlargement was of little concern.
Although I considered this political and symbolic dimension at least as much important as the economic one, it would be impossible to analyze all the aspects of the 2004 enlargement exhaustively in just 15 pages. This paper is consequently focused only on the economic results of the enlargement (what is still too ambitious in 15 pages!). That can seem to be premature only two years after the enlargement. Of course, it is. Economic results should be studied in the long run. On the other hand, we need to analyze intermediate results and current trends not only to better the economic integration of the 2004 new members but also in the perspective of the next enlargement: the adhesion of Romania and Bulgaria in 2007 or 2008.
Has the 2004 enlargement boosted the EU-15’s and/or new member states’ economies? Were Western Europeans’ initial fears justified actually? Has the EU-15 paid the bill for Eastern and Central European economic success?
Table of Contents- The challenging fifth enlargement has undeniably boosted new comer's economies.
- The fifth enlargement was a challenge.
- Two years later, an economic success?.
- Has Western Europe paid the bill for eastern and central European economic growth?.
- Western fears were not justified.
- A small impact on the EU's economy and budget.
« affects the distribution of the economic resources available between the state and the regional level at one of the milestones of European integration: the case ...» Document abstract
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3 word format
Language : english
european union
worksheets
date published
24/03/2006
review : not yet assessed
level : Expert
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SummaryDossier en anglais qui évalue l'assertion d'un auteur présentant l'Union européenne comme la fin des souverainetés nationales de ses états membres.
Le dossier présente et évalue les opinions d'auteurs opposés à cette affirmation, en mettant en évidence les éléments qui étaient la thèse d'une nouvelle forme de souveraineté, plutôt que d'une fin stricto sensu de la souveraineté.
Le dossier présente et évalue les opinions d'auteurs opposés à cette affirmation, en mettant en évidence les éléments qui étaient la thèse d'une nouvelle forme de souveraineté, plutôt que d'une fin stricto sensu de la souveraineté.
Table of Contents Les internautes ont également acheté « identity and national, or even regional, local identities? single currency was both an economic and political of confidence in the current integration model and ...» Document abstract
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11 word format
Language : english
european union
presentation
date published
29/11/2006
review : not yet assessed
level : Expert
requested 30 times
Summary“You don’t fall in love with a common market” (EU Commission President Jacques Delors in The European, 3 November 1994).
Here emerges one of today’s most challenging issues for the European Union: the prevalence of market integration has created a political vacuum and so-called “democratic deficit”, essentially for lack of a genuine identification from the European citizens with European stakes.
Indeed, it would be simplistic to consider that the EU project has failed in generating support from the peoples of the member states and, consequently, in establishing the democratic bases it lacks today. The reality is that the very project of the “Founding Fathers”, as presented in the Schuman Declaration (9 May 1950) relied on a combination of functionalism and technocratism that largely explains the a-political trajectory of the European construction. Theses developed by E. Haas in The Uniting of Europe (1958) relied on the dynamic of sector-related integration that should be initiated by “concrete achievements that first create a de facto solidarity”. So economic integration was supposed to create “common fates” between the member-states and to trigger an ineluctable spiral of integration (“spill over”) from economic to political integration. But, the practical requirement of such a theory equated a rational long-term planning incompatible with the emotional short-term demands of member-states’ publics. So the European project was deliberately placed in the hands of experts able to supervise a rationalized construction without letting any vested interest or passions interfering.
So the choice of technocratism entailed both a depoliticisation of the European construction and a founding contradiction: functionalism wanted economic integration to be a first step in European integration but technocratism prevented political integration from emerging.
But as the Union was moving from “issues of instrumental problem-solving to fundamental questions about its nature as part-formed polity” (Cable, 1994; Garcia, 1993; BBV foundation, 1993. in Laffan, 1996:p 82), the absence of political spill over become all the more problematic since it began to damage the legitimacy of the overall European project. That is why in 1992, the Treaty of Maastricht tried not only to fill in the gap between economic and political integration, towards the key-project of single currency, but also to promote the idea that “the maintenance of economic integration [rested] in some measure on political integration”, intrinsically linked with the emergence of a “sense of community” (Laffan: 96). So the “identity deficit” was officially presented as a fundamental barrier to the EU functioning insofar as the very European project relies on the presupposition of a “European transcending community of fates, values, lives, socio-economic stakes and of responsibility” (European Identity Charter, 1995). So one thing was to presuppose the potentiality of a strong European identity; another was to stimulate it. In that perspective, analyses of 1992 Eurobarometer clearly revealed the weakness of the sentiment of identification to the EU: attachment to Europe (48% against 51% of people who “never felt European) still appeared distanced by attachments to respectively the country (88%), the region (87%) and the village (85%) (Reif, 1993 in Laffan: 99).
Then, the new focus on “we feeling” opted in favour of the transposition of the spill over logic in which citizenship would be used as a Trojan horse. By transforming the “European worker” defined by the 1986 Single act into a “European citizen”, the Treaty of Maastricht and the 1995 Schengen Agreements intended to raise of the “We feel European” by implementing concrete European political rights. But the European citizenship remained determined by the centrality of national citizenships insofar as being a European citizen equals being a citizen of one of the EU member-states. Furthermore, citizenship is an imperfect tool in the sense that identity both precedes (what meaning for a citizenship without feeling part of an imagined community?) and prolongs citizenship (how to feel responsible without identifying with?). For all that, citizenship seems quite unlikely to generate a real “sense of community” and a transcending European identity by itself. On the contrary, only a strong European identity could give a real signification to the European citizenship and could enable the EU to challenge the nation-state’s political legitimacy monopoly.
As a consequence, two questions appear central in the identity deficit.
Firstly, how to articulate European identity and national, or even regional, local identities? Obviously, if a transcending European identity were to emerge, it would not be without (and even less against) national identities. So the sole credible basis on which to promote a European identity is member-states’ themselves, and more precisely on identity policies that would emphasize what is commonly shared rather than what differentiates between them. So, to adapt the European recurrent motto “unity in diversity”, the European identity has to be understood as an “identity of identities”. Then the articulation issue is all the more complex since the EU has to deal with the very nature of the identity it wants to shape. In other word, whereas national identities emerged essentially through the influence of the myth of national sovereignty and a very close sense of patriotism, the European identity can only be imagined as open and outstripping particular and often dangerous nationalist myths.
So the second question concerns the appropriate levers that will help the European identity emerging. What are the components of the European identity? The determination of such levers is all the more difficult since contrarily to the sentiment towards integration that can be conditioned by “materialistic” elements (sentiment of having benefited, sentiment of re-conquering power through the EU…), there is no such thing as an “interest of feeling European”. So the European identity relies on symbolic, psychological, ideological (cosmopolitanism or nationalism…) or emotional elements rather than on rational balances.
So I will try to answer this very question of the most significant components of a European identity (or negatively what is the most detrimental to the consolidation of a European identity?) in the light of three major axes that corresponds to the three dimension of identity (political, emotional, differentiation): “constitutional patriotism” (I), symbolic (II), and the “constitutive Other” (III).
To examine the impact of those three components on the European identity, I chose to work on the question Q46 of the eb620 questionnaire: “Would you say you are very proud, fairly proud, not very proud, not at all proud to be European?” as dependent variable (29334 respondents).
Such a question presents the great interest of being disconnected with comparisons between European identity and national identities and to consider the pride of being European as an overarching sentiment.
Here emerges one of today’s most challenging issues for the European Union: the prevalence of market integration has created a political vacuum and so-called “democratic deficit”, essentially for lack of a genuine identification from the European citizens with European stakes.
Indeed, it would be simplistic to consider that the EU project has failed in generating support from the peoples of the member states and, consequently, in establishing the democratic bases it lacks today. The reality is that the very project of the “Founding Fathers”, as presented in the Schuman Declaration (9 May 1950) relied on a combination of functionalism and technocratism that largely explains the a-political trajectory of the European construction. Theses developed by E. Haas in The Uniting of Europe (1958) relied on the dynamic of sector-related integration that should be initiated by “concrete achievements that first create a de facto solidarity”. So economic integration was supposed to create “common fates” between the member-states and to trigger an ineluctable spiral of integration (“spill over”) from economic to political integration. But, the practical requirement of such a theory equated a rational long-term planning incompatible with the emotional short-term demands of member-states’ publics. So the European project was deliberately placed in the hands of experts able to supervise a rationalized construction without letting any vested interest or passions interfering.
So the choice of technocratism entailed both a depoliticisation of the European construction and a founding contradiction: functionalism wanted economic integration to be a first step in European integration but technocratism prevented political integration from emerging.
But as the Union was moving from “issues of instrumental problem-solving to fundamental questions about its nature as part-formed polity” (Cable, 1994; Garcia, 1993; BBV foundation, 1993. in Laffan, 1996:p 82), the absence of political spill over become all the more problematic since it began to damage the legitimacy of the overall European project. That is why in 1992, the Treaty of Maastricht tried not only to fill in the gap between economic and political integration, towards the key-project of single currency, but also to promote the idea that “the maintenance of economic integration [rested] in some measure on political integration”, intrinsically linked with the emergence of a “sense of community” (Laffan: 96). So the “identity deficit” was officially presented as a fundamental barrier to the EU functioning insofar as the very European project relies on the presupposition of a “European transcending community of fates, values, lives, socio-economic stakes and of responsibility” (European Identity Charter, 1995). So one thing was to presuppose the potentiality of a strong European identity; another was to stimulate it. In that perspective, analyses of 1992 Eurobarometer clearly revealed the weakness of the sentiment of identification to the EU: attachment to Europe (48% against 51% of people who “never felt European) still appeared distanced by attachments to respectively the country (88%), the region (87%) and the village (85%) (Reif, 1993 in Laffan: 99).
Then, the new focus on “we feeling” opted in favour of the transposition of the spill over logic in which citizenship would be used as a Trojan horse. By transforming the “European worker” defined by the 1986 Single act into a “European citizen”, the Treaty of Maastricht and the 1995 Schengen Agreements intended to raise of the “We feel European” by implementing concrete European political rights. But the European citizenship remained determined by the centrality of national citizenships insofar as being a European citizen equals being a citizen of one of the EU member-states. Furthermore, citizenship is an imperfect tool in the sense that identity both precedes (what meaning for a citizenship without feeling part of an imagined community?) and prolongs citizenship (how to feel responsible without identifying with?). For all that, citizenship seems quite unlikely to generate a real “sense of community” and a transcending European identity by itself. On the contrary, only a strong European identity could give a real signification to the European citizenship and could enable the EU to challenge the nation-state’s political legitimacy monopoly.
As a consequence, two questions appear central in the identity deficit.
Firstly, how to articulate European identity and national, or even regional, local identities? Obviously, if a transcending European identity were to emerge, it would not be without (and even less against) national identities. So the sole credible basis on which to promote a European identity is member-states’ themselves, and more precisely on identity policies that would emphasize what is commonly shared rather than what differentiates between them. So, to adapt the European recurrent motto “unity in diversity”, the European identity has to be understood as an “identity of identities”. Then the articulation issue is all the more complex since the EU has to deal with the very nature of the identity it wants to shape. In other word, whereas national identities emerged essentially through the influence of the myth of national sovereignty and a very close sense of patriotism, the European identity can only be imagined as open and outstripping particular and often dangerous nationalist myths.
So the second question concerns the appropriate levers that will help the European identity emerging. What are the components of the European identity? The determination of such levers is all the more difficult since contrarily to the sentiment towards integration that can be conditioned by “materialistic” elements (sentiment of having benefited, sentiment of re-conquering power through the EU…), there is no such thing as an “interest of feeling European”. So the European identity relies on symbolic, psychological, ideological (cosmopolitanism or nationalism…) or emotional elements rather than on rational balances.
So I will try to answer this very question of the most significant components of a European identity (or negatively what is the most detrimental to the consolidation of a European identity?) in the light of three major axes that corresponds to the three dimension of identity (political, emotional, differentiation): “constitutional patriotism” (I), symbolic (II), and the “constitutive Other” (III).
To examine the impact of those three components on the European identity, I chose to work on the question Q46 of the eb620 questionnaire: “Would you say you are very proud, fairly proud, not very proud, not at all proud to be European?” as dependent variable (29334 respondents).
Such a question presents the great interest of being disconnected with comparisons between European identity and national identities and to consider the pride of being European as an overarching sentiment.
Table of Contents- ´Constitutional patriotism´.
- Literature.
- Model.
- Data.
- Results.
- Symbols and iconography.
- The ´constitutive other´.
What are the challenges facing the EU in its attempts to establish democratic institutional structures ?
« Moreover, a better involvement of regional and local In this regard, horizontal integration of citizens through has emerged on the four economic freedoms in ...» Document abstract
$6.95
7 word format
Language : english
European law
presentation
date published
31/08/2006
review : not yet assessed
level : Expert
requested 32 times
Summary“It is time to recognise that the Union has moved from a diplomatic to a democratic process, with policies that reach deep into national societies and daily life” . This statement by the European Commission subsumes ten years of political and academic on-going debate on the “democratic deficit” of the EU. The main trigger of this issue was the launch of political integration by Treaty of Maastricht. As a result, the democratisation of the Union has been at the centre of all Treaty changes in the nineteen ninentees, which accounted for the urgent need felt by both political leaders and EU bureaucrats for enhancing the legitimacy of the EU. The failure of the Constitution’s ratification process shows how crucial it remains to identify the challenges facing the EU in its attempts to establish democratic institutional structures, if the former are to be addressed. This paper will argue that these challenges are related to the undertaken shift from an elitist structure based on Nation-States to a multi-level polity including all citizens. Since these two ideas are ideal-types situated at both ends of a spectrum, the position the EU holds or should hold varies along normative lines. Institutional structures will be understood here in the (broad) constructivist sense, ie as all institutionalised processes that characterise the EU as a polity, including – next to institutions themselves – constitutionalised values, mecanisms for participation, decision-making processes, etc. Democracy will be defined as a mode of governance characterised by a set of procedures but also by substantive values , both aiming at guaranteeing the election by citizens of representatives on a pluralist basis, the respect of the rule of law, as well as the protection of the rights and freedoms of individuals and minorities. Dealing with challenges requires th consider three relevant topics: the current situation, the objectives pursued by the EU and the – both conceptual and practical – obstacles on the way. Thus, I will first examine the obstacles towards a multi-level system of governance specific to the EU. Then, I will go on the impediments to the shift from an elitist and functionally fragmented decision-making structure to a more inclusive political community.
Table of Contents- Theorizing and achieving a model of democracy specific to the EU .
- The current picture: the blatant inadequacy of both supranational and intergovernmental models .
- The EU as a multi-level polity: conceptual and practical obstacles.
- From an elitist and functionnally fragmentated polity to an inclusive political community.
- The current picture: democratic legitimacy prevented by the ´cognitive deficit´ and the unbalanced representation of societal interests.
- The challenge: towards an enhanced citizen's involvment and a ´European social contract´?.
« one hand, and its regional developments - "global better-integrated political bedrock in the European Union. different phases of economic integration in the ...» Document abstract
$9.95
11 word format
Language : english
political science
presentation
date published
20/02/2007
review : not yet assessed
level : Expert
requested 32 times
SummaryThis essay deals with one of the most controversial questions in today’s social science debates: the relationship between the nation-state and globalisation. Globalisation, understood quite loosely here as a series of contemporary and unprecedented developments in the economic, social and cultural integration of world market and societies – in other words, a general sense of the shortening of distance between here and there, us and the Other – implies a new definition of the field of social relationships, a definition that is much less centred on the national level and takes more account of the global.
In these conditions, the end of the nation-state may be at hand. According to this view, the nation-state, which has been the only entity of international importance since the Westphalia treaties of 1648, is now the subject of increasing strains. It is doomed to lose more and more of its power in the twenty-first century. In the realm of worldwide action and global participation, how can the territorially limited and ideologically outdated nation-state survive ?
One should always be cautious about seemingly-obvious statements, especially on issues of national reach. Lessons from the past show us that the nation-state has flourished from very sturdy roots, roots that have many times proven stronger than the winds of change. Still, some signs, such as the appearance of many new institutions of global governance, cannot be ignored: what scope remains for the state in the new distribution of power brought about by globalisation ?
I will attempt here to show that the most challenging aspect of globalisation for the nation-state is not economic revolution, contrary to common belief. Indeed integration of world markets adds as many opportunities for states as it does bounds to their sovereignty. Globalisation also means new forms of contacts and exchanges between cultures, making people ever more aware of global issues that concern all of humanity. I will argue that it is in this new “global consciousness” that the greatest threats for the sovereignty and legitimacy of nation-states lie, with one crucial question lying in waiting: will future globalisation be up to the challenge of democracy and accountability?
This essay will be structured around two parts. In the first one, I will tackle the still burning debate of economic globalisation and the fate of the nation-states, taking sides with those who do not want to proclaim the end of the nation-state too soon. In the second part, I will concentrate on more political and social issues, attempting in a few words to show that globalisation requires new forms of democracy that may prove a big challenge to contemporary political organisations.
In these conditions, the end of the nation-state may be at hand. According to this view, the nation-state, which has been the only entity of international importance since the Westphalia treaties of 1648, is now the subject of increasing strains. It is doomed to lose more and more of its power in the twenty-first century. In the realm of worldwide action and global participation, how can the territorially limited and ideologically outdated nation-state survive ?
One should always be cautious about seemingly-obvious statements, especially on issues of national reach. Lessons from the past show us that the nation-state has flourished from very sturdy roots, roots that have many times proven stronger than the winds of change. Still, some signs, such as the appearance of many new institutions of global governance, cannot be ignored: what scope remains for the state in the new distribution of power brought about by globalisation ?
I will attempt here to show that the most challenging aspect of globalisation for the nation-state is not economic revolution, contrary to common belief. Indeed integration of world markets adds as many opportunities for states as it does bounds to their sovereignty. Globalisation also means new forms of contacts and exchanges between cultures, making people ever more aware of global issues that concern all of humanity. I will argue that it is in this new “global consciousness” that the greatest threats for the sovereignty and legitimacy of nation-states lie, with one crucial question lying in waiting: will future globalisation be up to the challenge of democracy and accountability?
This essay will be structured around two parts. In the first one, I will tackle the still burning debate of economic globalisation and the fate of the nation-states, taking sides with those who do not want to proclaim the end of the nation-state too soon. In the second part, I will concentrate on more political and social issues, attempting in a few words to show that globalisation requires new forms of democracy that may prove a big challenge to contemporary political organisations.
Table of Contents- Economic Globalisation and the Role of the State
- Social globalisation and new forms of democracy
« security and are factors of regional destabilisation, as already taken: exploit Iran's economic weaknesses with a clear choice between integration and isolation ...» Document abstract
$8.95
9 word format
Language : english
international relations
worksheets
date published
24/03/2006
review : not yet assessed
level : Expert
requested 13 times
Summary As diplomats from the 190 signatory countries gather in New York this week for the five-yearly review of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Iran will surely be present in many minds. Although some warning signs had been issued by various intelligence services during the previous decade, concern over Iran’s nuclear programme became widespread in August 2002, with the discovery of the Natanz installation, destined for uranium enrichment. In October 2003, an agreement was reached in Tehran, between Iran and the foreign ministers of the three “big” members of the European Union, France, Germany and the United Kingdom. Iran agreed to suspend all enrichment-related activities, adhere to the International Atomic Energy Agency’s additional protocol requiring more intrusive inspections, and provide full information about its nuclear programme. In return, the EU-3 promised that the issue would not go before the UN Security Council and pledged to provide technology to Iran, including in the civil nuclear area. However, the IAEA later found that a report submitted by Iran omitted references to activities involving advanced centrifuges and to the production of polonium, a material used in the making of nuclear bombs.
Table of Contents- Based on your reading of the literature on nuclear proliferation, what would be an appropriate strategy toward Iran's alleged nuclear programme' Discuss with reference either to the policies of a particular state, international organization, or, more generally, the international community
Les internautes ont également acheté « For Tito, "ideological integration replaces ethnic integration". The regional governments could act freely and openly down by the parlous economic condition of ...» Document abstract
$7.95
8 word format
Language : english
international relations
presentation
date published
20/12/2006
review : not yet assessed
level : Advanced
requested 14 times
SummaryThe Second Yugoslavia created in 1943, under the name of Democratic Federation of Yugoslavia, was a federal state consisting of six republics -Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia- and two autonomous provinces - Kosovo and Vojvodina. It became the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia in 1946 and then the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1963. This federation broke up in the early 1990s when Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence on June 25, 1991, followed by Macedonia in October and Bosnia Herzegovina in November. What explains this disintegration? It is impossible to reduce “the complexity of socialist Yugoslav disintegration to some supposed pre-eminent factor. On the contrary, economics choices, institutional structures, religious cultures, elite dynamics, and deficiencies in system legitimacy all played a role in pushing the country toward violent break-up”. Indeed, “the disintegration of Yugoslavia had many causes, not a single one”. Yugoslavia was a mosaic of ethnic groups, whose unity was undermined by Tito’s death, economic crisis, ethnic tensions, changing international context and the rise of nationalism in the 1980s.
Table of Contents- Creation in 1943 of the Second Yugoslavia
- A mosaic of ethnic groups, languages and religions which made unity difficult.
- The deaths of Vice-president Edvard Kardelj in 1979 and President Tito in 1980 deprived the country of imposing unity.
« candidates on party lists in local, regional, parliamentary and such as social, political and economic matters in 2004 Annexe 4: Political integration of women ...» Document abstract
$9.95
32 word format
Language : english
political science
theses
date published
17/10/2006
review : not yet assessed
level : Advanced
requested 15 times
SummaryNowadays women are increasingly accessing to high political positions in State office. Indeed, three women recently reached the status of Head of State in different countries: Michelle Bachelet in Chile, Ellen Johnson-Sirlead in Liberia, and Tarja Halonen in Finland. Moreover, women play more crucial roles on the political scene than before, as it is the case in France with the ambitious Ségolène Royal who is currently working very hard to become a possible presidential candidate and to overcome male scoffing. Nonetheless, progress in the inclusion of women’s voices in politics and government has proved difficult. Despite some well-known world leaders, such as Margaret Thatcher, Gro Harlem Bruntland and Golda Meir, only thirty-nine countries have ever elected a woman president or Prime Minister. According to the UN report, today women compose less than one-tenth of the world’s cabinet ministers (Inglehart and Norris, 2003).
Indeed, the gender variable is often used in political studies to explain political phenomena, in confronting men and women behaviours, even if other elements (like age, profession, social status …) are available to grasp striking individual differences towards politics. However, it is important to introduce qualifications concerning the relevance of a gender approach because women do not always constitute a homogeneous group. But this does not jeopardize this study since it has been proven that political conducts exist proper to female.
When studying women in politics, several relevant approaches can be envisaged. For instance, gender gaps in voting behaviours had been for a long time put forward as women appeared to become more inclined than men to vote in the left of the political field since the 1980s (Oskarson, 1995) despite their traditional and apparently well-established conservatism. Comparing gender differences in ideology, public opinion and electoral preferences can be considered as being the most common approach to elaborate the meaning of the term ‘gender gap’.
Nevertheless, concerning gender and politics, two conceptions have been developed namely the pessimistic and the optimistic perspectives. The first one aimed at stressing permanent predominance of males and consequently the continuous female exclusion. In this view, even the increasing proportion of women in political bodies is justified by the decline in the power and significance of political institutions. Moreover, the fact that women have integrated the so-called ‘soft side’ of politics (meaning the low status fields) restricts the relevance of female increasing empowerment (Bergqvist, 1999). The second approach asserts a sure degree of autonomy of politics and political institutions envisaging the possibility of positive changes in gender political positions because of the great importance given to actors. Today, the optimistic view takes prevalence in most studies.
For our part, we found germane to rely on Rokkan’s model, developed in the 1970s, which resorts to four institutional thresholds that must be passed or overcome by the mobilising women group to achieve political power in parliamentary system (Raaum, 2004). In this model, each threshold constitutes an institutional obstacle while each phase in between can be considered as mobilisation periods.
Our study will focus on a comparative approach of female representation in politics at the national level of each country, i.e. France and four Nordic countries (Sweden, Denmark, Norway and Finland). We put aside the Icelandic case since its gender profile differs from the situation in the four other Nordic countries. Indeed, its level of female political representation is relatively low (mainly because of its electoral system) and the social citizenship of Icelandic women has not been as broad as in the rest of the Nordic countries (Borchorst, Christensen, Raaum, 1999). Icelandic society has been regarded as a ‘strong male-breadwinner model’ (Raaum, 2004). Thus, from now on, the expression ‘Nordic countries’ encompasses only these major four countries. Besides, France seems to be an appropriate case on that subject as equality between men and women in politics has been a controversial and thorny question in our native country for decades.
Finally, let us clarify a few details on the Nordic case. In comparative studies, many authors lay the emphasis on the homogeneity of the Nordic countries in designating them as a ‘case apart’ in the matter of female representation (Karvonen, Selle, 1995). As tending to be at the top of the list concerning women representation in politics, Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Finland are often considered by the optimists as well as by the pessimists as a special model because of its unique character and its attempt to build a brighter future for women. However, we cannot deny that even though the Nordic countries share many common features, it must be admitted that several differences remain on the subject notably concerning the women integration strategies elaborated in each country. As it is highlighting by Christensen, the Nordic countries have chosen to develop various strategies in order to integrate women especially in the political field. For instance, Finland and Sweden have opted for a ‘classic strategy’ by relying upon a tradition of women’ s sections in the political parties but also on the penetration of new women mobilisation in the parties. On the other hand, Norway and Denmark have done differently. Indeed, Norway has followed a ‘modern strategy’; for instance, through the strengthening of the parties by the new mobilisation women or by their integration by means of quotas. Denmark, for its part, did not develop any integration strategy as the mobilisation of women used channels other than political parties since women for example lack sections within the parties (Christensen, 1999). Nonetheless, the central statistics underline that the Nordic countries offer a specific model of women representation in politics. In fact, in the early 1990s, there were 30 percent of women in Nordic parliaments whereas the world average, even today, hardly reaches about 16 percent. In addition, what is striking is that such a pattern is met not only concerning parliaments but also with regards to the executive branch of governments and to cabinet members. Agreeing with this rationale, we will compare the performance of the Nordic model to the French situation with respect to the four thresholds of women mobilisation.
In fact, theories about women and political power set a discrepancy between, on the one hand, women’s lack of authority and, on the other hand, the political practice indicating their increasing degree of mobilisation as decision-makers in public policies. The political mobilisation of Nordic women constitutes a striking contrast to the so-called ‘powerlessness model’ to which France in our study may relatively belong (Raaum, 1995).
Luckily, thanks to reports provided by national French and Nordic authorities, numerous data on our subject are available that will constitute the point of departure of our study. These figures shed light on the existing gap of women representation in politics between France and the Nordic countries. Hence, we can wonder how these countries, close in many aspects such as economic development, may be so divergent in the field of our study as France is much far from realizing women expectations.
On this subject, many scholars put forward a common theory of the 1960s and early 1970s which argued that economic growth was the most effective strategy and incentive for the improvements of women status (Inglehart, Norris, 2003). These authors rely upon other factors to explain ‘the rising tide of gender equality’ such as the role of state or the cultural variable. To our point of view, we must follow this rationale in evoking other factors for women empowerment as we are comparing countries which are close economically speaking.
Our cross-national study will concentrate first on empirical and historical data illustrating the gap in women political presence between France and the Nordic countries (1). Then, we will try to sort out possible explanations for these differences that go beyond economic factors (2). Finally, it appears relevant to introduce a perspective on our subject by tackling the question of measures that aim at promoting women political representation (3).
Indeed, the gender variable is often used in political studies to explain political phenomena, in confronting men and women behaviours, even if other elements (like age, profession, social status …) are available to grasp striking individual differences towards politics. However, it is important to introduce qualifications concerning the relevance of a gender approach because women do not always constitute a homogeneous group. But this does not jeopardize this study since it has been proven that political conducts exist proper to female.
When studying women in politics, several relevant approaches can be envisaged. For instance, gender gaps in voting behaviours had been for a long time put forward as women appeared to become more inclined than men to vote in the left of the political field since the 1980s (Oskarson, 1995) despite their traditional and apparently well-established conservatism. Comparing gender differences in ideology, public opinion and electoral preferences can be considered as being the most common approach to elaborate the meaning of the term ‘gender gap’.
Nevertheless, concerning gender and politics, two conceptions have been developed namely the pessimistic and the optimistic perspectives. The first one aimed at stressing permanent predominance of males and consequently the continuous female exclusion. In this view, even the increasing proportion of women in political bodies is justified by the decline in the power and significance of political institutions. Moreover, the fact that women have integrated the so-called ‘soft side’ of politics (meaning the low status fields) restricts the relevance of female increasing empowerment (Bergqvist, 1999). The second approach asserts a sure degree of autonomy of politics and political institutions envisaging the possibility of positive changes in gender political positions because of the great importance given to actors. Today, the optimistic view takes prevalence in most studies.
For our part, we found germane to rely on Rokkan’s model, developed in the 1970s, which resorts to four institutional thresholds that must be passed or overcome by the mobilising women group to achieve political power in parliamentary system (Raaum, 2004). In this model, each threshold constitutes an institutional obstacle while each phase in between can be considered as mobilisation periods.
Our study will focus on a comparative approach of female representation in politics at the national level of each country, i.e. France and four Nordic countries (Sweden, Denmark, Norway and Finland). We put aside the Icelandic case since its gender profile differs from the situation in the four other Nordic countries. Indeed, its level of female political representation is relatively low (mainly because of its electoral system) and the social citizenship of Icelandic women has not been as broad as in the rest of the Nordic countries (Borchorst, Christensen, Raaum, 1999). Icelandic society has been regarded as a ‘strong male-breadwinner model’ (Raaum, 2004). Thus, from now on, the expression ‘Nordic countries’ encompasses only these major four countries. Besides, France seems to be an appropriate case on that subject as equality between men and women in politics has been a controversial and thorny question in our native country for decades.
Finally, let us clarify a few details on the Nordic case. In comparative studies, many authors lay the emphasis on the homogeneity of the Nordic countries in designating them as a ‘case apart’ in the matter of female representation (Karvonen, Selle, 1995). As tending to be at the top of the list concerning women representation in politics, Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Finland are often considered by the optimists as well as by the pessimists as a special model because of its unique character and its attempt to build a brighter future for women. However, we cannot deny that even though the Nordic countries share many common features, it must be admitted that several differences remain on the subject notably concerning the women integration strategies elaborated in each country. As it is highlighting by Christensen, the Nordic countries have chosen to develop various strategies in order to integrate women especially in the political field. For instance, Finland and Sweden have opted for a ‘classic strategy’ by relying upon a tradition of women’ s sections in the political parties but also on the penetration of new women mobilisation in the parties. On the other hand, Norway and Denmark have done differently. Indeed, Norway has followed a ‘modern strategy’; for instance, through the strengthening of the parties by the new mobilisation women or by their integration by means of quotas. Denmark, for its part, did not develop any integration strategy as the mobilisation of women used channels other than political parties since women for example lack sections within the parties (Christensen, 1999). Nonetheless, the central statistics underline that the Nordic countries offer a specific model of women representation in politics. In fact, in the early 1990s, there were 30 percent of women in Nordic parliaments whereas the world average, even today, hardly reaches about 16 percent. In addition, what is striking is that such a pattern is met not only concerning parliaments but also with regards to the executive branch of governments and to cabinet members. Agreeing with this rationale, we will compare the performance of the Nordic model to the French situation with respect to the four thresholds of women mobilisation.
In fact, theories about women and political power set a discrepancy between, on the one hand, women’s lack of authority and, on the other hand, the political practice indicating their increasing degree of mobilisation as decision-makers in public policies. The political mobilisation of Nordic women constitutes a striking contrast to the so-called ‘powerlessness model’ to which France in our study may relatively belong (Raaum, 1995).
Luckily, thanks to reports provided by national French and Nordic authorities, numerous data on our subject are available that will constitute the point of departure of our study. These figures shed light on the existing gap of women representation in politics between France and the Nordic countries. Hence, we can wonder how these countries, close in many aspects such as economic development, may be so divergent in the field of our study as France is much far from realizing women expectations.
On this subject, many scholars put forward a common theory of the 1960s and early 1970s which argued that economic growth was the most effective strategy and incentive for the improvements of women status (Inglehart, Norris, 2003). These authors rely upon other factors to explain ‘the rising tide of gender equality’ such as the role of state or the cultural variable. To our point of view, we must follow this rationale in evoking other factors for women empowerment as we are comparing countries which are close economically speaking.
Our cross-national study will concentrate first on empirical and historical data illustrating the gap in women political presence between France and the Nordic countries (1). Then, we will try to sort out possible explanations for these differences that go beyond economic factors (2). Finally, it appears relevant to introduce a perspective on our subject by tackling the question of measures that aim at promoting women political representation (3).
Table of Contents- Historical and empirical data illustrating the gap in women mobilisation
- Rokkan's model on mobilisation of women in parliamentary politics
- The main and illustrative data of women political representation in France and in the Nordic countries
- The insufficiency of economic arguments for our study
- Beyond economic explanations: alternative factors to grasp the gap
- General cultural barriers to women empowerment
- The specific religious factor in women mobilisation
- An alternative and complementary explanation: the prevalence of institutional obstacles
- The increasing importance of affirmative actions: the nordic tolerance vs. French resistance to institutional promotion of women representation
- The implementation of quotas: general
- The Nordic countries: an incremental model
- The original French parity
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