« My role as a boyfriend interferes with my role as a son. . Many of our personality traits are paramount to our role performance. . ...» Document abstract
$5.95
6 word format
Language : english
sociology
presentation
date published
15/04/2008
review : not yet assessed
level : General public
requested 0 times
SummaryThe roles that a person plays in circles in society, in a family, in the workplace, or even while driving on the road are linked to each other and can have positive or adverse affects on each other. One situation or role where a person is encouraged behave in a negative manner can alter or totally nullify another situation or role where a person is encouraged to behave in a positive manner. The personality traits of that person can have an affect on how much of an impact role strain causes between roles. In this paper I will analyze my own personality traits, my most important roles, my overview of my level of performance in those roles, and how I feel those roles have and are affecting each other.
Table of Contents
- My most significant trait is identified as anxiety.
- Modesty is a key in being altruistic and also helps one maintain friends and family.
- Existing as a son and living at home with both my mother and father comes with a certain level of expectations.
- Looking back at my traffic record I am not doing badly in this area.
- Having a leadership role at my job I also play the part of a supervisor.
- Between two people,being a boy/girlfriend has been one of the most difficult roles to fulfill and to even understand.
- To be a good writer of fiction one must devote large amounts of time to the art.
- My role as a boyfriend interferes with my role as a son.
- Many of our personality traits are paramount to our role performance.
The Many Faces of Michel Foucault: An Analysis of the Evolution of his Conception of Identity Formation in the Modern World Through his Life and Works
« flock while a select few played the role of the He wrote, "Our civilization has developed the most complex and power?" Thus, by providing an analysis of state ...» Document abstract
$9.95
20 word format
Language : english
social sciences
presentation
date published
18/02/2008
review : not yet assessed
level : Advanced
requested 0 times
SummaryThroughout the course of his career as a historian, author, philosopher, and artist, Michel Foucault often shifted directions in his work, reinventing himself in the process and offering little explanation for his decisions to do so. Shortly after the publication of Madness and Civilization in 1961, he commanded, “Do not ask me who I am, and do no tell me to remain the same.” Foucault’s approach to his life and work, which he often referred to as an art form and an abstraction, consequently made any endeavor to provide a conclusive analysis of his life and career inherently antithetical to both his methodology and to the breadth of his subject matter. With that contradiction in mind, scholars have nevertheless remained devoted to investigating patterns, variations, and trends in both his work and approach. Thus, a slightly fragmented and openly speculative analysis of Foucault’s work has since become the most appropriate and effective way to study the multifaceted and inherently paradoxical nature of Michel Foucault’s work.
Table of Contents
- Foucault conceived of himself in a perpetual state of eternal evolution.
- Paul Rabinow, a scholar and former colleague of Foucault, provided a model for viewing the shift in Foucault's work.
- Foucault was further influenced by Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morals.
- Foucault moved through Discipline and Punish chronologically.
- In continuing with his assessment of punishment, Foucault turned toward the creation of precise disciplines.
- Jeremy Bentham's Panopticon perhaps best illustrated Foucault's point regarding the creation of docile bodies.
- He questioned the increasingly humane treatment that most scholars praised.
« are connected by the symbolic meaning that our society gives to Freudian analysis provides much to say about this bizarre As Freud writes of the role of father ...» Document abstract
$7.95
8 word format
Language : english
film studies
school essay
date published
02/10/2007
review : not yet assessed
level : Advanced
requested 6 times
SummaryImagination is fundamental to human life. Indeed, all the ‘humanities’ are manifestations of the creative instinct that finds its origin in imagination. One creative imagination communicates its images to another in an attempt to bridge the perceived space between two minds. Hillman suggests that, just as painting in the Renaissance made the imaginative leap from flat representation to spatial perspective, when deeper imaginable dimensions are achieved through the evolution of art forms, the viewer reaches “a new relation with the image and closer participation ‘in’ its ‘reality’ (212).” In modern times, film represents another such leap; it is a medium that augments visual art with the temporal dimension, allowing the direct projection of entire narratives into the psyche of another, by means of creating a reality that is more authentically shared between the creative mind and its audience (of other creative minds).
Table of Contents
- Imagination is fundamental to human life. Indeed, all the ‘humanities' are manifestations of the creative instinct that finds its origin in imagination.
- The film Magnolia, written and directed by P.T. Anderson, presents an array of psychological issues that can be interpreted according to theories of the object-relations, analytic, and depth-psychological schools of psychology.
- Magnolia opens with a montage of pseudo-historical events, each so extravagantly coincidental as to imply that ‘something else' is at work.
- The first lead character that the viewer of Magnolia meets is Frank TJ Mackey, a TV performer whose program ‘Seduce and Destroy' enjoys a cult-following in its audience of sexually frustrated men.
- In a scene inter-spliced with ‘Seduce and Destroy' seminar footage, Mackey is interviewed by Guinevere, a female reporter who uncovers information implying the psychological mechanisms of the TV-cult.
- After the relationship between Mackey and Earl has been introduced, the audience of Magnolia meets another family with psycho-sexual issues.
- The last film character the audience meets is Jim, a Christian police officer who, after offering a short prayer under a crucifix, claps his hands like he's ready for action.
- When Jim is called to investigate Claudia's house after a neighbor complained of noise, he is forced to hide his immediate sexual attraction under the guise of official business.
- Directly after the surreal musical number, the rain that has drizzled in the background for the entire film clears up, and the characters begin to take control of their lives.
- This archetypal scene influences each of the characters towards self-realization.
« seeks to make sense out of our historical and Peacock, "poetry plays a less significant role in advanced the collection of evidence and to analysis as opposed ...» Document abstract
$6.95
7 word format
Language : english
literature
book review
date published
17/05/2007
review : not yet assessed
level : Advanced
requested 4 times
SummaryOffering a precise and coherent definition of artistic movements has always been a tempting prospect for whoever seeks to make sense out of our historical and cultural background. One has to confess, that it is equally tempting to approach the Romantic period in an attempt to set fixed chronological boundaries and to attribute predefined literary themes and political interests to this extremely rich age in English literature. Indeed the names of Blake, Wordsworth, Coleridge, Scott, Byron, Shelley and Keats are often associated with the Romantic Movement. Greatly influenced by Lord Byron’s writing, the romantic poet quickly became associated with the figure of a rebel or “sensitive individual who rejected worldliness, and even, literally, this vulgar material world for a better” (p 3); one could thus imagine that the Romantic Poet would also be a “political rebel”. However, Marilyn Butler immediately questions these clear-cut definitions and stereotypes. First, by pointing out to the fact that the use of the term “romantic” to define these artists is somewhat anachronistic since the writers themselves never really claimed to belong to an organised school or movement just as the definition of romanticism has always evolved throughout history. The author then reminds us that Romantics, whether in Germany, France or Britain, have not always supported revolutions and radicalism as one could have expected, and that romanticism was initially of a rather conservative nature. Realising that to be objective, it is necessary to look at romanticism from its earliest origins in the late 18th Century, Butler refuses to separate the authors from their historical and social context and reminds us that English Literature at the end of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th centuries needs to be considered as “product and part of social experience”. By placing these poets into their historical context, Butler refuses to provide a universal definition of romanticism thus pointing towards the unique character or specificity of English Romanticism.
Table of Contents
- Introduction
- Offering a precise and coherent definition of artistic movements
- The Arts in an Age of Revolution: 1769-1790
- Art for the people in the revolutionary decade: Blake, Gillray and Wordsworth
- The Rise of the Man of Letters: Coleridge
- Novels for the gentry: Austen and Scott
- The cult of the South: the Shelley circle, its creed and influence
- The war of intellectuals: from Wordsworth to Keats
- Romantic novel, Romantic prose.
- Conclusion: the question of romanticism in England
« the others (8.3% against 5.4% for "positive role" and 6.6 Conclusion Finally, in our attempt to test three theories Bruter's analysis has been based on a model ...» Document abstract
$9.95
11 word format
Language : english
european union
presentation
date published
29/11/2006
review : not yet assessed
level : Expert
requested 30 times
Summary“You don’t fall in love with a common market” (EU Commission President Jacques Delors in The European, 3 November 1994).
Here emerges one of today’s most challenging issues for the European Union: the prevalence of market integration has created a political vacuum and so-called “democratic deficit”, essentially for lack of a genuine identification from the European citizens with European stakes.
Indeed, it would be simplistic to consider that the EU project has failed in generating support from the peoples of the member states and, consequently, in establishing the democratic bases it lacks today. The reality is that the very project of the “Founding Fathers”, as presented in the Schuman Declaration (9 May 1950) relied on a combination of functionalism and technocratism that largely explains the a-political trajectory of the European construction. Theses developed by E. Haas in The Uniting of Europe (1958) relied on the dynamic of sector-related integration that should be initiated by “concrete achievements that first create a de facto solidarity”. So economic integration was supposed to create “common fates” between the member-states and to trigger an ineluctable spiral of integration (“spill over”) from economic to political integration. But, the practical requirement of such a theory equated a rational long-term planning incompatible with the emotional short-term demands of member-states’ publics. So the European project was deliberately placed in the hands of experts able to supervise a rationalized construction without letting any vested interest or passions interfering.
So the choice of technocratism entailed both a depoliticisation of the European construction and a founding contradiction: functionalism wanted economic integration to be a first step in European integration but technocratism prevented political integration from emerging.
But as the Union was moving from “issues of instrumental problem-solving to fundamental questions about its nature as part-formed polity” (Cable, 1994; Garcia, 1993; BBV foundation, 1993. in Laffan, 1996:p 82), the absence of political spill over become all the more problematic since it began to damage the legitimacy of the overall European project. That is why in 1992, the Treaty of Maastricht tried not only to fill in the gap between economic and political integration, towards the key-project of single currency, but also to promote the idea that “the maintenance of economic integration [rested] in some measure on political integration”, intrinsically linked with the emergence of a “sense of community” (Laffan: 96). So the “identity deficit” was officially presented as a fundamental barrier to the EU functioning insofar as the very European project relies on the presupposition of a “European transcending community of fates, values, lives, socio-economic stakes and of responsibility” (European Identity Charter, 1995). So one thing was to presuppose the potentiality of a strong European identity; another was to stimulate it. In that perspective, analyses of 1992 Eurobarometer clearly revealed the weakness of the sentiment of identification to the EU: attachment to Europe (48% against 51% of people who “never felt European) still appeared distanced by attachments to respectively the country (88%), the region (87%) and the village (85%) (Reif, 1993 in Laffan: 99).
Then, the new focus on “we feeling” opted in favour of the transposition of the spill over logic in which citizenship would be used as a Trojan horse. By transforming the “European worker” defined by the 1986 Single act into a “European citizen”, the Treaty of Maastricht and the 1995 Schengen Agreements intended to raise of the “We feel European” by implementing concrete European political rights. But the European citizenship remained determined by the centrality of national citizenships insofar as being a European citizen equals being a citizen of one of the EU member-states. Furthermore, citizenship is an imperfect tool in the sense that identity both precedes (what meaning for a citizenship without feeling part of an imagined community?) and prolongs citizenship (how to feel responsible without identifying with?). For all that, citizenship seems quite unlikely to generate a real “sense of community” and a transcending European identity by itself. On the contrary, only a strong European identity could give a real signification to the European citizenship and could enable the EU to challenge the nation-state’s political legitimacy monopoly.
As a consequence, two questions appear central in the identity deficit.
Firstly, how to articulate European identity and national, or even regional, local identities? Obviously, if a transcending European identity were to emerge, it would not be without (and even less against) national identities. So the sole credible basis on which to promote a European identity is member-states’ themselves, and more precisely on identity policies that would emphasize what is commonly shared rather than what differentiates between them. So, to adapt the European recurrent motto “unity in diversity”, the European identity has to be understood as an “identity of identities”. Then the articulation issue is all the more complex since the EU has to deal with the very nature of the identity it wants to shape. In other word, whereas national identities emerged essentially through the influence of the myth of national sovereignty and a very close sense of patriotism, the European identity can only be imagined as open and outstripping particular and often dangerous nationalist myths.
So the second question concerns the appropriate levers that will help the European identity emerging. What are the components of the European identity? The determination of such levers is all the more difficult since contrarily to the sentiment towards integration that can be conditioned by “materialistic” elements (sentiment of having benefited, sentiment of re-conquering power through the EU…), there is no such thing as an “interest of feeling European”. So the European identity relies on symbolic, psychological, ideological (cosmopolitanism or nationalism…) or emotional elements rather than on rational balances.
So I will try to answer this very question of the most significant components of a European identity (or negatively what is the most detrimental to the consolidation of a European identity?) in the light of three major axes that corresponds to the three dimension of identity (political, emotional, differentiation): “constitutional patriotism” (I), symbolic (II), and the “constitutive Other” (III).
To examine the impact of those three components on the European identity, I chose to work on the question Q46 of the eb620 questionnaire: “Would you say you are very proud, fairly proud, not very proud, not at all proud to be European?” as dependent variable (29334 respondents).
Such a question presents the great interest of being disconnected with comparisons between European identity and national identities and to consider the pride of being European as an overarching sentiment.
Here emerges one of today’s most challenging issues for the European Union: the prevalence of market integration has created a political vacuum and so-called “democratic deficit”, essentially for lack of a genuine identification from the European citizens with European stakes.
Indeed, it would be simplistic to consider that the EU project has failed in generating support from the peoples of the member states and, consequently, in establishing the democratic bases it lacks today. The reality is that the very project of the “Founding Fathers”, as presented in the Schuman Declaration (9 May 1950) relied on a combination of functionalism and technocratism that largely explains the a-political trajectory of the European construction. Theses developed by E. Haas in The Uniting of Europe (1958) relied on the dynamic of sector-related integration that should be initiated by “concrete achievements that first create a de facto solidarity”. So economic integration was supposed to create “common fates” between the member-states and to trigger an ineluctable spiral of integration (“spill over”) from economic to political integration. But, the practical requirement of such a theory equated a rational long-term planning incompatible with the emotional short-term demands of member-states’ publics. So the European project was deliberately placed in the hands of experts able to supervise a rationalized construction without letting any vested interest or passions interfering.
So the choice of technocratism entailed both a depoliticisation of the European construction and a founding contradiction: functionalism wanted economic integration to be a first step in European integration but technocratism prevented political integration from emerging.
But as the Union was moving from “issues of instrumental problem-solving to fundamental questions about its nature as part-formed polity” (Cable, 1994; Garcia, 1993; BBV foundation, 1993. in Laffan, 1996:p 82), the absence of political spill over become all the more problematic since it began to damage the legitimacy of the overall European project. That is why in 1992, the Treaty of Maastricht tried not only to fill in the gap between economic and political integration, towards the key-project of single currency, but also to promote the idea that “the maintenance of economic integration [rested] in some measure on political integration”, intrinsically linked with the emergence of a “sense of community” (Laffan: 96). So the “identity deficit” was officially presented as a fundamental barrier to the EU functioning insofar as the very European project relies on the presupposition of a “European transcending community of fates, values, lives, socio-economic stakes and of responsibility” (European Identity Charter, 1995). So one thing was to presuppose the potentiality of a strong European identity; another was to stimulate it. In that perspective, analyses of 1992 Eurobarometer clearly revealed the weakness of the sentiment of identification to the EU: attachment to Europe (48% against 51% of people who “never felt European) still appeared distanced by attachments to respectively the country (88%), the region (87%) and the village (85%) (Reif, 1993 in Laffan: 99).
Then, the new focus on “we feeling” opted in favour of the transposition of the spill over logic in which citizenship would be used as a Trojan horse. By transforming the “European worker” defined by the 1986 Single act into a “European citizen”, the Treaty of Maastricht and the 1995 Schengen Agreements intended to raise of the “We feel European” by implementing concrete European political rights. But the European citizenship remained determined by the centrality of national citizenships insofar as being a European citizen equals being a citizen of one of the EU member-states. Furthermore, citizenship is an imperfect tool in the sense that identity both precedes (what meaning for a citizenship without feeling part of an imagined community?) and prolongs citizenship (how to feel responsible without identifying with?). For all that, citizenship seems quite unlikely to generate a real “sense of community” and a transcending European identity by itself. On the contrary, only a strong European identity could give a real signification to the European citizenship and could enable the EU to challenge the nation-state’s political legitimacy monopoly.
As a consequence, two questions appear central in the identity deficit.
Firstly, how to articulate European identity and national, or even regional, local identities? Obviously, if a transcending European identity were to emerge, it would not be without (and even less against) national identities. So the sole credible basis on which to promote a European identity is member-states’ themselves, and more precisely on identity policies that would emphasize what is commonly shared rather than what differentiates between them. So, to adapt the European recurrent motto “unity in diversity”, the European identity has to be understood as an “identity of identities”. Then the articulation issue is all the more complex since the EU has to deal with the very nature of the identity it wants to shape. In other word, whereas national identities emerged essentially through the influence of the myth of national sovereignty and a very close sense of patriotism, the European identity can only be imagined as open and outstripping particular and often dangerous nationalist myths.
So the second question concerns the appropriate levers that will help the European identity emerging. What are the components of the European identity? The determination of such levers is all the more difficult since contrarily to the sentiment towards integration that can be conditioned by “materialistic” elements (sentiment of having benefited, sentiment of re-conquering power through the EU…), there is no such thing as an “interest of feeling European”. So the European identity relies on symbolic, psychological, ideological (cosmopolitanism or nationalism…) or emotional elements rather than on rational balances.
So I will try to answer this very question of the most significant components of a European identity (or negatively what is the most detrimental to the consolidation of a European identity?) in the light of three major axes that corresponds to the three dimension of identity (political, emotional, differentiation): “constitutional patriotism” (I), symbolic (II), and the “constitutive Other” (III).
To examine the impact of those three components on the European identity, I chose to work on the question Q46 of the eb620 questionnaire: “Would you say you are very proud, fairly proud, not very proud, not at all proud to be European?” as dependent variable (29334 respondents).
Such a question presents the great interest of being disconnected with comparisons between European identity and national identities and to consider the pride of being European as an overarching sentiment.
Table of Contents
- ´Constitutional patriotism´.
- Literature.
- Model.
- Data.
- Results.
- Symbols and iconography.
- The ´constitutive other´.
« the elements in music that elicit our emotional responses can context plays an impor- tant role in the possibly lend themselves for statistical analysis may be ...» Document abstract
$9.95
59 word format
Language : english
linguistics
presentation
date published
27/07/2006
review : not yet assessed
level : Expert
requested 15 times
SummaryThe hypothesis of Zipf concerning a universal Principle of Least Effort, manifesting itself in Zipf ’s law and modeled by Ferrer i Cancho and Sol´e in a signal-object reference matrix, gave rise to the idea that maybe the elements
in music that elicit our emotional responses can be identified. The unde- niable relation between music and emotion was the reason to consider a possible signal-emotion reference system analogous to the signal-object ref- erence in natural human language. Following Zipf ’s line of reasoning, music
as an exponent of human behaviour is subject to the Principle of Least Effort and is consequently structured in such a way that the distribution pattern
of the signals that “communicate the musical message” follows a power law.
In this thesis the possibility to deploy the characteristics of the Zipf curve to gain more insight into the relation between music and emotion was investi- gated. From the elements that, viewed in the framework of a signal-emotion reference could qualify as the signals that elicit emotion, two were investi- gated, viz. notes and intervals. Experiments were performed on 18 single classical music pieces from 18 different composers and on a larger classical music corpus. Results indicate that intervals have a distribution pattern that comes closest to a Zipf curve, but neither data type exhibits a gen- uine Zipf distribution. Further research will be needed to decide whether the method that was applied could be a useful tool in the search for the elements that elicit emotion.
in music that elicit our emotional responses can be identified. The unde- niable relation between music and emotion was the reason to consider a possible signal-emotion reference system analogous to the signal-object ref- erence in natural human language. Following Zipf ’s line of reasoning, music
as an exponent of human behaviour is subject to the Principle of Least Effort and is consequently structured in such a way that the distribution pattern
of the signals that “communicate the musical message” follows a power law.
In this thesis the possibility to deploy the characteristics of the Zipf curve to gain more insight into the relation between music and emotion was investi- gated. From the elements that, viewed in the framework of a signal-emotion reference could qualify as the signals that elicit emotion, two were investi- gated, viz. notes and intervals. Experiments were performed on 18 single classical music pieces from 18 different composers and on a larger classical music corpus. Results indicate that intervals have a distribution pattern that comes closest to a Zipf curve, but neither data type exhibits a gen- uine Zipf distribution. Further research will be needed to decide whether the method that was applied could be a useful tool in the search for the elements that elicit emotion.
Table of Contents
- Quantitative linguistics
- Frequency distributions
- Entropy
- Previous research
- Balancing effort
- Data types
- Corpus size
- Music and Zipf 's law
- Music and communication
- Music and emotion
- Research question
- Experimental setup
- Results
- The rank-frequency distribution of notes and intervals
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