« The Cold War A Change in Policy After the defeat of the Axis powers in World War II, two super powers remained in the world: the United States and the Soviet ...» Document abstract
$2.95
3 word format
Language : english
history 1789 to present
school essay
date published
03/10/2007
review : not yet assessed
level : General public
requested 1 times
SummaryAfter the defeat of the Axis powers in World War II, two super powers remained in the world: the United States and the Soviet Union. These two nations had very different views about the world and their political regimes were polar opposites. During the beginning of the Cold War, which lasted until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the United States was viewed as the leader of the free world. The US had just defeated fascism in World War II and had begun to undertake the fight against communism. The US government received unprecedented support from both its citizens and leaders around the world in its struggle against communism.
Table of Contents- After the defeat of the Axis powers in World War II, two super powers remained in the world
- In 1947, shortly after the end of World War II, the United States received word that Greece and Turkey were about to fall into the hands of the communist
- The end of the Second World War left the continent of Europe in ruin.
- President Eisenhower's actions towards another Third World country in the Middle East would have similar lasting effects
- The threat of a communist takeover of free nations was best exemplified in Asia
- Similar to the Korean War, the war in Vietnam began as an intervention to protect a country from communist takeover.
- Just as foreign leaders had trouble trusting the leaders of the United States after the many conflicts of the period, the American people held a similar distrust
- The changes that occurred during the first thirty years of the Cold War caused a monumental change in how foreign countries view the United States
« relations between the USSR and United States marked the beginning of the Cold War. This post-war period singled the change of foreign policy for America. ...» Document abstract
$2.95
3 word format
Language : english
political science
school essay
date published
08/10/2007
review : not yet assessed
level : General public
requested 2 times
SummaryMany people describe the period between World War I and World War II as a time of United States isolationism, but that is a common misconception. While it is true that during the interwar period America was very politically isolationist, the country was very imperialistic economically. Following the end of WWI, Woodrow Wilson announced his idea of the League of Nations to the fellow victors at Versailles. Wilson described the League as an instrument to “protect against external aggression the territorially integrity and existing political independence of all Embers of the League” Despite his efforts, the league was voted down and the United States became politically isolated until the outbreak of WWII. The US repeatedly turned a blind eye to the deteriorating situation in Europe, hoping that those nations could solve their own problems. The isolationist spirit prevented a quick entry for America into the Second World War, prolonging the war by an extra year. The brutal fighting that took place during the war changed the outlook of policy makers after the defeat of Hitler. Upon the conclusion of the fighting the United States turned in to an “internationalist” nation, which wanted to prevent a similar event from occurring and halt the spread of the communist threat of the East.
Table of Contents- Many people describe the period between World War I and World War II as a time of United States isolationism, but that is a common misconception.
- When the United States entered into a period of isolation following World War I, the country was not embarking on a new concept, but simply returning to its roots.
- Despite the United State's policy of political isolation during the interwar years, the country extended its economic involvement to all parts of the globe.
- In spite of their best efforts towards isolationism, the United States could not continue to ignore the fighting taking place in Europe.
- The battles of World War II were vastly different from the previous war, forcing the United States to reconsider its previous policy of isolationism.
- Unlike the close of the First World War, the United States took charge in leading the peace conferences that followed the end of the fighting.
- Truman's declaration marked the beginning of the policy of containment popularized by George Kennan.
« the dominance that the US held during the Cold War, the tactics development of the US-terrorism and war will not globalization has led to a change in America's ...» Document abstract
$4.95
5 word format
Language : english
international relations
presentation
date published
17/06/2008
review : not yet assessed
level : Advanced
requested 0 times
SummaryOver the course of the last two centuries, the United States has established itself as an economic, political and military leader in the international community. Although it is quite evident that the US has been the dominant world power throughout the course of the twentieth century, like many great empires, the United States appears to be on the decline. In addition to the fact that the US is not the thriving economic center that it once was, current economic data on other countries and regions of the world suggest that the US will continue to decline as developing nations push toward industrialization. Despite this reality, the United States government continues to press forward asserting its primacy and hegemony in the international community.With the realization that the US as an empire is one the decline, there is a clear impetus to examine how the government’s primacy will impact the nation with respect to the international community. Using this as a basis for investigation, this research seeks to answer the following question: Is US primacy actually a stimulus to war, or a means of achieving international order? Through a careful consideration of what has been written about US hegemony and its impact on the development of international relations, it will be possible to demonstrate that US primacy is a precipitant of war.
Table of Contents- Introduction
- The Current Position of the United States
- Assessing the Current Position of the United States
- Defining Terrorism
- Conclusion
'Washington bears a considerable amount of the responsibility for the radicalism of the Iranian Revolution and the resultant deterioration in US-Iranian relations'
« The dual containment policy that has prevailed since the rise the Middle East doesn't help change the Iranians Iran and the United States: A Cold War Case Study ...» Document abstract
$2.95
3 word format
Language : english
international relations
presentation
date published
09/03/2002
review : not yet assessed
level : Advanced
requested 9 times
Summary'When examining the policies that the United States conducted toward Iran from 1945 to 1979, one cannot help but realize that Washington bears a considerable amount of the responsibility for the radicalism of the Iranian Revolution and the resultant deterioration in US-Iranian relations.' Evaluate the merits of this statement. Be sure to use the arguments of Richard Cottam in IRAN AND THE UNITED STATES as the starting point of your discussion'
Table of Contents- Iran's expectations on the United States
- Iran as a mainly geostrategic concern to the United States
- What went wrong'
Les internautes ont également acheté « containment and deterrence used since the beginning of the Cold War. there was no real debate before the War in Iraq. to Americans, this is not a change in the ...» Document abstract
$3.95
4 word format
Language : english
political science
book review
date published
29/11/2006
review : not yet assessed
level : Advanced
requested 2 times
SummaryWar And The American Presidency was written by Arthur Schlesinger Jr., who used to be an adviser for Adlai Stevenson’s campaign and a special assistant to President Kennedy . He participated in the founding of Americans for Democratic Action, “America's oldest independent liberal lobbying organization” . Schlesinger wrote many famous books about the American politics, including the much heralded work The Imperial Presidency (1973). War And The American Presidency was published in September 2004, two months before the presidential elections. As a liberal historian, it is not a surprise that Schlesinger disapproves with the so-called “Bush doctrine”, but as the author underlines it in the Foreword (p. XI), the “historical dimension” is essential to understanding current issues such as the war in Iraq.
Arthur Schlesinger Jr. first highlights a fact often forgotten: unilateralism is not a new foreign policy in America. George Washington already extolled the virtues of isolationism, which was limited to political relationships. According to Richard H. Rovere, isolationism is the old word standing for unilateralism (p. 3). The two World Wars and the Cold War created a need for collective security, but one can observe a resurgence of unilateralism today, an example being the distrust towards the United Nations (p. 17). Schlesinger is nevertheless convinced that unilateralism cannot work, and that it will fail in the future. The second major element of Bush’s policy is the “preventive war”, ending the traditional combination of containment and deterrence used since the beginning of the Cold War. The author clarifies the difference between “preemptive” and “preventive” war. The Bush administration claims that it applies the former, but a preemptive war answers a “direct, immediate, specific threat that must be crushed at one” (p. 23). Even the CIA declared that there was no imminent threat from Iraq, which leads Schlesinger to the conclusion that it is a preventive war, that is to say, a “potential, future, therefore speculative threat”. It was an easier target than the war on terrorism (p. 31). Thus, war “becomes a matter of presidential choice” (p. 21) and signals the renewal of the “imperial presidency”. This increase in executive powers can be a danger for democracy if it lasts. Then, the author analyzes the history of dissent in wartime through centuries. He notices that, even though Presidents have attempted to stop dissent with special acts, such as the Alien and Sedition Acts set by John Adams’ administration or the Espionage and Sedition Acts during Wilson’s presidency, criticism has always existed. He quotes the Copperheads of the Civil War, in other words “northern men with southern convictions” (p. 78). About recent history, he could have mentioned the numerous peace protests opposing the Vietnam War. He deplores that the debate preceding the Iraq War lacked quality (p. 81). Dealing with democracy, he also deplores that the Electoral College did not follow the popular choice four times in history and proposes a “bonus plan”: “to award the popular-vote winner a bonus of two electoral votes for each state and the District of Columbia” (p. 102). Additionally, he wonders whether democracy has a future during this new century of “religious fanaticism” (p. 116). Democracy will be confronted with many challenges during the twenty first century, but is able to remain thanks to its capacity of self-correction. Schlesinger concludes the book with the role of history in policymaking. History instructs what not to do rather than what to do, and one should be careful with historical analogy.
Arthur Schlesinger Jr. first highlights a fact often forgotten: unilateralism is not a new foreign policy in America. George Washington already extolled the virtues of isolationism, which was limited to political relationships. According to Richard H. Rovere, isolationism is the old word standing for unilateralism (p. 3). The two World Wars and the Cold War created a need for collective security, but one can observe a resurgence of unilateralism today, an example being the distrust towards the United Nations (p. 17). Schlesinger is nevertheless convinced that unilateralism cannot work, and that it will fail in the future. The second major element of Bush’s policy is the “preventive war”, ending the traditional combination of containment and deterrence used since the beginning of the Cold War. The author clarifies the difference between “preemptive” and “preventive” war. The Bush administration claims that it applies the former, but a preemptive war answers a “direct, immediate, specific threat that must be crushed at one” (p. 23). Even the CIA declared that there was no imminent threat from Iraq, which leads Schlesinger to the conclusion that it is a preventive war, that is to say, a “potential, future, therefore speculative threat”. It was an easier target than the war on terrorism (p. 31). Thus, war “becomes a matter of presidential choice” (p. 21) and signals the renewal of the “imperial presidency”. This increase in executive powers can be a danger for democracy if it lasts. Then, the author analyzes the history of dissent in wartime through centuries. He notices that, even though Presidents have attempted to stop dissent with special acts, such as the Alien and Sedition Acts set by John Adams’ administration or the Espionage and Sedition Acts during Wilson’s presidency, criticism has always existed. He quotes the Copperheads of the Civil War, in other words “northern men with southern convictions” (p. 78). About recent history, he could have mentioned the numerous peace protests opposing the Vietnam War. He deplores that the debate preceding the Iraq War lacked quality (p. 81). Dealing with democracy, he also deplores that the Electoral College did not follow the popular choice four times in history and proposes a “bonus plan”: “to award the popular-vote winner a bonus of two electoral votes for each state and the District of Columbia” (p. 102). Additionally, he wonders whether democracy has a future during this new century of “religious fanaticism” (p. 116). Democracy will be confronted with many challenges during the twenty first century, but is able to remain thanks to its capacity of self-correction. Schlesinger concludes the book with the role of history in policymaking. History instructs what not to do rather than what to do, and one should be careful with historical analogy.
Table of Contents- Unilateralism is not a new foreign policy in America
- The content of the book is highly guided by the political context: the presidential elections of 2004
- Schlesinger's style is simple, and sentences quite short, allowing him to appear to a popular audience
« will disappear if the great powers change their behavior Contemporary Foreign Policy Issue: Terrorism In June 2001 During the Cold War, the main adversary of the ...» Document abstract
$6.95
7 word format
Language : english
international relations
presentation
date published
29/11/2006
review : not yet assessed
level : Advanced
requested 8 times
SummaryThrough the process of critical oral history, Robert McNamara has re-evaluated his experience as the Secretary of Defense under the Kennedy and Johnson presidencies. Filmmaker Errol Morris shaped his documentary The Fog of War around eleven lessons from the life of McNamara. The first two lessons are “Empathize with your enemy” and “Rationality will not save us.” They are useful to think about for future foreign policy making, even though they have limits. The contemporary issue of terrorism shows how applicable the lessons are.
In the documentary The Fog of War, Robert McNamara gives a clear definition of empathy: “We must try to put ourselves inside their [our enemies’] skin and look at us through their eyes, just to understand the thoughts that lie behind their decisions and their actions.” Empathy is different from sympathy; it does not imply having feelings, but rather it implies understanding the thoughts and feelings of one’s enemy (Ralph K. White). R. White goes further by stating that decision-makers are wrong when they do not see their opponents’ fear, anger, and longing for peace .
The Cuban Missile Crisis is the best-known case of empathy. In 1962, U.S. foreign policy makers did not trust Khrushchev. On October 26 and 27, the Kennedy administration received two letters from the Soviet leader: first a private letter offering the removal of Soviet missiles in Cuba in exchange for a U.S. promise of non-invasion of Cuba, then a public letter adding the removal of U.S. missiles in Turkey to the deal. Kennedy concluded that the public letter was the official position of USSR. He felt that the Soviets were likely to attack the U.S. missiles in Turkey if they were not satisfied by the American response. The only member of the ExComm who dared contradicting the President was Llewellyn “Tommy” Thompson, former U.S. Ambassador to Moscow. Thompson, who had lived close to Khrushchev in Moscow, perceived that the Soviet leader was willing to avoid a conflict. He said to Kennedy: “The important thing for Khrushchev, it seems to me, is to be able to say: ‘I saved Cuba. I stopped an invasion.’” Thompson was right; President Kennedy responded to the private letter, and a nuclear war was avoided. After the crisis, the two countries reached the conclusion that more communication and understanding was necessary; therefore, the Hotline linking the White House with the Kremlin was established in 1963. During a discussion in Cambridge in 1987, Robert McNamara learned that the Soviet missiles had been deployed in Cuba because of the fear of an imminent U.S. invasion of Cuba. Twenty-five years later, it was still hard for the former Soviet decision-makers to believe that the United States had no plan to invade Cuba after the Bay of Pigs fiasco. The Soviets, as well as the Americans, had failed to occupy their enemy’s mindset.
In the documentary The Fog of War, Robert McNamara gives a clear definition of empathy: “We must try to put ourselves inside their [our enemies’] skin and look at us through their eyes, just to understand the thoughts that lie behind their decisions and their actions.” Empathy is different from sympathy; it does not imply having feelings, but rather it implies understanding the thoughts and feelings of one’s enemy (Ralph K. White). R. White goes further by stating that decision-makers are wrong when they do not see their opponents’ fear, anger, and longing for peace .
The Cuban Missile Crisis is the best-known case of empathy. In 1962, U.S. foreign policy makers did not trust Khrushchev. On October 26 and 27, the Kennedy administration received two letters from the Soviet leader: first a private letter offering the removal of Soviet missiles in Cuba in exchange for a U.S. promise of non-invasion of Cuba, then a public letter adding the removal of U.S. missiles in Turkey to the deal. Kennedy concluded that the public letter was the official position of USSR. He felt that the Soviets were likely to attack the U.S. missiles in Turkey if they were not satisfied by the American response. The only member of the ExComm who dared contradicting the President was Llewellyn “Tommy” Thompson, former U.S. Ambassador to Moscow. Thompson, who had lived close to Khrushchev in Moscow, perceived that the Soviet leader was willing to avoid a conflict. He said to Kennedy: “The important thing for Khrushchev, it seems to me, is to be able to say: ‘I saved Cuba. I stopped an invasion.’” Thompson was right; President Kennedy responded to the private letter, and a nuclear war was avoided. After the crisis, the two countries reached the conclusion that more communication and understanding was necessary; therefore, the Hotline linking the White House with the Kremlin was established in 1963. During a discussion in Cambridge in 1987, Robert McNamara learned that the Soviet missiles had been deployed in Cuba because of the fear of an imminent U.S. invasion of Cuba. Twenty-five years later, it was still hard for the former Soviet decision-makers to believe that the United States had no plan to invade Cuba after the Bay of Pigs fiasco. The Soviets, as well as the Americans, had failed to occupy their enemy’s mindset.
Table of Contents- Lesson One: 'Empathize with Your Enemy?
- Lesson Two: 'Rationality Will Not Save Us?
- Contemporary Foreign Policy Issue: Terrorism
« successful in bringing about political changeThe Dalai its use in actual foreign policy still tends Boyer comments that "during the cold war, Lindsey and ...» Document abstract
$8.95
9 word format
Language : english
humanities/philosophy
presentation
date published
02/10/2007
review : not yet assessed
level : Advanced
requested 0 times
SummaryWar is a situation that embodies the principle of duality: one side is pitted against another in an “an act of violence intended to compel an opponent to fulfill our will .” That will, whatever it may be, “has its root in a political object ” that is determined within ideological constraints. This pattern is corroborated by conclusions determined by other human endeavors. Psychologically speaking, perception precedes action; philosophically, ontology precedes ethics, and politically, ideology precedes war. As the soldier-cum-philosopher of war Clausewitz muses, “Is not War merely another kind of writing and language for political thoughts? .”
Table of Contents- However, neither militarism nor pacifism describe monolithic entities; both terms connote sets of ideologies under which many subsets exist
- Both pacifism and eschatological militarism assume religious significance within a political context
- In order to be examined as an ideology in general, it is useful to first divorce pacifism from any specific religious formulations, and analyze it in its ideal philosophical form.
- The Fourteenth Dalai Lama, exiled religious and political leader of Tibet, explains that According to Buddhist psychology, most of our troubles are due to our passionate desire for and attachment to things that we misapprehend as enduring entities
- In reaction to the brutal occupation that followed, armed elements of the Tibetan population were actually trained by the CIA, which hoped to use the Tibetan cause to fight against Communist China.
- If pacifism has failed in the example of Tibet, it has much to do with Phillips' critique of pacifism as a means of engaging in conflict.
- The history of religious pacifisms does not end with the ideally pacifist example of Buddhism.
- The pacifist impulse thus exists at the root of both Eastern and Western faiths
The civil war in Greece: the role of the Greek civil war in the International History of the post war era
« became necessary for the success of the policy of containing was a very important episode of the cold war in the This radical change was made by Truman who was ...» Document abstract
$9.95
12 word format
Language : english
history 1789 to present
presentation
date published
27/07/2006
review : not yet assessed
level : Expert
requested 10 times
SummaryThe Greek civil war took place between 1943 and 1949. It is one of the most painful episodes of Greece history. We can wonder what was the role of the Greek civil war in the International History of post war era, especially its belonging to the transitional period between the end of the Second World War and the start of the Cold War.
First, I will show that this war was not merely a domestic issue. Then, I will describe the characteristics of the Anglo-American interventions in Greece which gave to the Greek civil war its international dimension. Finally, I will show that this conflict was an important episode of the cold war even if the involvement of western powers was based on incorrect perceptions of Soviet objectives.
First, I will show that this war was not merely a domestic issue. Then, I will describe the characteristics of the Anglo-American interventions in Greece which gave to the Greek civil war its international dimension. Finally, I will show that this conflict was an important episode of the cold war even if the involvement of western powers was based on incorrect perceptions of Soviet objectives.
Table of Contents- The Greek civil war: a dual conflict
- The Greek context
- The Greek civil war and its international aspect
- The Anglo-American intervention in the Greek civil war
- Great Britain's intervention
- The American relief
- The signification of the Greek civil war in international history
- The Greek civil war and the Cold War: the Anglo-American side
- The controversial question of the Soviet's involvement: the perceptions of the Soviet involvement
« 1994), but the movement was not influent enough to change the US foreign policy. be possible given the existing situation, that is the Cold War, since Cuba ...» Document abstract
$6.95
7 word format
Language : english
international relations
presentation
date published
29/11/2006
review : not yet assessed
level : Advanced
requested 6 times
SummaryIn 1898, the United States intervened in the Caribbean and Pacific to fight against Spanish imperialism. In the aftermath of the Spanish-American War, the United States occupied Cuba from January 1899 to May 1902. On February 25, 1901, Senator Orville H. Platt introduced in Congress “the famous amendment that bears his name” (Aguilar 1972), which shaped the American intervention in Cuban affairs. It also proposed the creation of an American naval base in Cuba. The bill became law on March 2. In spite of a strong opposition in the country, Cuba conceded that a restricted independence was better than a military regime (Aguilar 1972) and included the amendment in its 1901 Constitution. In 1903, the Lease of Coaling or Naval Stations Agreement Between the United States and Cuba Treaty specified that, in exchange of “the continuance of the ultimate sovereignty of the Republic of Cuba, … the United states shall exercise complete jurisdiction and control over and within said areas” (Treaty Series No. 418). Since then, Guantánamo Bay has been under U.S. control.
Although the Platt Amendment was abrogated by Cuba in 1904, a new agreement was negotiated between the Roosevelt administration and the American-friendly Caffery-Batista-Mendieta government. It kept the “Platt spirit” (Dominguez, Smith 1988) by not changing the status of Guantánamo, “so long as the United States of America shall not abandon the said naval station of Guantanamo or the two Governments shall not agree to a modification of its present limits” (Treaty Series No. 866). Thus, the new Treaty of Relations established a “lease in perpetuity” (Dominguez, Smith 1988).
Since the revolution in 1959, Cuba has wanted to terminate the lease, but it is has not been able to do so without American consent (Ratner, Ray 2004). In opposition to the lease, Fidel Castro has always refused to accept the rent of about $4,085 a year. On October 29, 1962, during the Cuban Missile Crisis, Castro declared that the only effective guarantee “that there will be no aggression against Cuba” would be five points , including the U.S. withdrawal from Guantánamo Naval Base (Blight, Brenner 2004). This request was supported by the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries in its First Summit Conference , held in Belgrade in 1961 (Ricardo Luis 1994), but the movement was not influent enough to change the U.S. foreign policy.
Although the Platt Amendment was abrogated by Cuba in 1904, a new agreement was negotiated between the Roosevelt administration and the American-friendly Caffery-Batista-Mendieta government. It kept the “Platt spirit” (Dominguez, Smith 1988) by not changing the status of Guantánamo, “so long as the United States of America shall not abandon the said naval station of Guantanamo or the two Governments shall not agree to a modification of its present limits” (Treaty Series No. 866). Thus, the new Treaty of Relations established a “lease in perpetuity” (Dominguez, Smith 1988).
Since the revolution in 1959, Cuba has wanted to terminate the lease, but it is has not been able to do so without American consent (Ratner, Ray 2004). In opposition to the lease, Fidel Castro has always refused to accept the rent of about $4,085 a year. On October 29, 1962, during the Cuban Missile Crisis, Castro declared that the only effective guarantee “that there will be no aggression against Cuba” would be five points , including the U.S. withdrawal from Guantánamo Naval Base (Blight, Brenner 2004). This request was supported by the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries in its First Summit Conference , held in Belgrade in 1961 (Ricardo Luis 1994), but the movement was not influent enough to change the U.S. foreign policy.
Table of Contents- Issue background: Guantánamo and the United States since 1898
- Courses of action
- Arguments: why Guantánamo should return to Cuba
knowledge network
Sort by
Subject :
Type :
Extension :
Language :
Size :