« The economic results of the 2004 enlargement of the European Union Introduction I- The challenging fifth enlargement has undeniably boosted new comer's ...» Document abstract
$9.95
15 word format
Language : english
economics
presentation
date published
21/08/2006
review : not yet assessed
level : General public
requested 14 times
SummaryTwo years ago, the European Union was joined by 10 new members whose 8 were former communist countries (plus Malta and Cyprus). The fifth enlargement has been the most ambitious in the history of the European Union. It was the largest ever in terms of number of countries (10) and population (75 million) acceding to the European Union. It was the most challenging in terms of disparity of wealth. Achieving the politic and economic reunification of Europe 15 years after the fall of the Berlin wall, it was the most symbolic since the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community which had achieved the French-German reconciliation.
Nevertheless, Eurobarometers showed this strongly symbolic enlargement meet a true enthusiasm neither in old members nor in new comers. Instead, the debate between pros and cons has been mainly situated at the economic level. Western Europeans mainly feared that the enlargement would cause industry outsourcing and Eastern workers’ immigration and thus raise unemployment in Western Europe. Many thought that the enlargement would come at a huge cost for the EU budget or would reduce the EU subsidiaries, including the CAP, they benefited from. Have these initial fears been fulfilled? On the other hand, the pros claimed that the enlargement would boost economy in both old and new members and that the European integration would accelerate the catching-up process and thus decrease the risk of outsourcing. What do the trends reveal two years later? In the context of high unemployment and lowest economic growth in Western Europe than outside, the political and symbolic dimension of the fifth enlargement was of little concern.
Although I considered this political and symbolic dimension at least as much important as the economic one, it would be impossible to analyze all the aspects of the 2004 enlargement exhaustively in just 15 pages. This paper is consequently focused only on the economic results of the enlargement (what is still too ambitious in 15 pages!). That can seem to be premature only two years after the enlargement. Of course, it is. Economic results should be studied in the long run. On the other hand, we need to analyze intermediate results and current trends not only to better the economic integration of the 2004 new members but also in the perspective of the next enlargement: the adhesion of Romania and Bulgaria in 2007 or 2008.
Has the 2004 enlargement boosted the EU-15’s and/or new member states’ economies? Were Western Europeans’ initial fears justified actually? Has the EU-15 paid the bill for Eastern and Central European economic success?
Nevertheless, Eurobarometers showed this strongly symbolic enlargement meet a true enthusiasm neither in old members nor in new comers. Instead, the debate between pros and cons has been mainly situated at the economic level. Western Europeans mainly feared that the enlargement would cause industry outsourcing and Eastern workers’ immigration and thus raise unemployment in Western Europe. Many thought that the enlargement would come at a huge cost for the EU budget or would reduce the EU subsidiaries, including the CAP, they benefited from. Have these initial fears been fulfilled? On the other hand, the pros claimed that the enlargement would boost economy in both old and new members and that the European integration would accelerate the catching-up process and thus decrease the risk of outsourcing. What do the trends reveal two years later? In the context of high unemployment and lowest economic growth in Western Europe than outside, the political and symbolic dimension of the fifth enlargement was of little concern.
Although I considered this political and symbolic dimension at least as much important as the economic one, it would be impossible to analyze all the aspects of the 2004 enlargement exhaustively in just 15 pages. This paper is consequently focused only on the economic results of the enlargement (what is still too ambitious in 15 pages!). That can seem to be premature only two years after the enlargement. Of course, it is. Economic results should be studied in the long run. On the other hand, we need to analyze intermediate results and current trends not only to better the economic integration of the 2004 new members but also in the perspective of the next enlargement: the adhesion of Romania and Bulgaria in 2007 or 2008.
Has the 2004 enlargement boosted the EU-15’s and/or new member states’ economies? Were Western Europeans’ initial fears justified actually? Has the EU-15 paid the bill for Eastern and Central European economic success?
Table of Contents
- The challenging fifth enlargement has undeniably boosted new comer's economies.
- The fifth enlargement was a challenge.
- Two years later, an economic success?.
- Has Western Europe paid the bill for eastern and central European economic growth?.
- Western fears were not justified.
- A small impact on the EU's economy and budget.
The results of the “Lisbon agenda” – the attempt to make Europe the world’s most successful knowledge-based economy – are generally thought to have been disappointing. What steps should be taken by the European Union, and by national governments, to impro
« is needed, whereas the mid-term results show that Consequently, economic growth was rather sluggish in the The 2004 enlargement has a statistical effect but is ...» Document abstract
$4.95
5 word format
Language : english
economics
presentation
date published
20/04/2007
review : not yet assessed
level : Expert
requested 5 times
SummaryIn March 2000, the Lisbon Strategy was launched to overcome a series of weaknesses in the European economy: long-term structural unemployment, a poor employment rate, and under-development of the service sector. In an often-quoted sentence, it has therefore assigned the EU “a new strategic goal for the next decade: to become the most competitive and most dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth, with more and better and greater social cohesion”. The mid-term results published five years after the launch reveal that the focus on knowledge is right but that the sense of urgency is lacking, leaving Europe lagging behind the objectives set and behind the benchmark model of the Unites States. Moreover, Europe is also loosing ground vis-à-vis other competitors such as China and India, which have been growing at substantially higher rates. The mid-term report also declares that the social and environmental aspects of the Lisbon Agenda were no longer a priority and that instead the strategy would be revised to focus on the economic context only.
Hence, in order to keep the Lisbon strategy alive, drastic changes are necessitated, which this paper aims at presenting. Due to the word limit, only major recommendations from the literature review on the future steps to adopt are offered here. However, due to the complexity of the European situation, the focus is wider than on the sheer economic context.
Hence, in order to keep the Lisbon strategy alive, drastic changes are necessitated, which this paper aims at presenting. Due to the word limit, only major recommendations from the literature review on the future steps to adopt are offered here. However, due to the complexity of the European situation, the focus is wider than on the sheer economic context.
Table of Contents
- Ambitious goals set
- Structural changes
- The Lisbon strategy of 2000 sets the ambitious goal (among others) of achieving an Labour markets
- Education and research
- ICT sector
« consultation on the 1st of December 2004 where 58 The sociological analysis of the results show that the of the Constitution - especially on economic and social ...» Document abstract
$8.95
9 word format
Language : english
political science
presentation
date published
31/08/2006
review : not yet assessed
level : Expert
requested 8 times
SummaryThe question wether there is currently something that can be called the crisis of social-democracy is arguable: after all, social-democractic and socialist parties are still the counterpart of Conservatives and Christian-democrats, sharing alternaltively government responsibilities at national level as well as in the European Parliament. Nevertheless the major transformations of the last 25 years, namely the acceleration of both globalization and Europeanization has upset the core of both the Social Democratic ideology and policies: the central role of the Welfare State. Thus, socialist politicians have to face the hegemony of the neo-liberal ideology and the fundamentally liberal nature of the European project based on the single market. Besides, the ideological debate on the political meaning of choices made for the economic governance in Europe tends to be watered down by the genuine weakness of party politics in the EU institutional constellation. Regarding this background, how has the social-democratic movement developped at European level?
The first step draws back to 1974 with the creation of the Confederation of the Socialist Parties (CSP) of the European Community related to the coming first direct election of the Assembly of the EC in 1979. At this early stage, the CSP was a very weak entity: on the organisational level, its was little more than appendices of the national parties ; while on the ideological level it was devided on the issue of European integration as a consequence of the Northern enlargement and the membership of the British, Danish and Irish Labour parties . With the introduction of Article 138 A in the Treaty of Maastricht and the recognition of the positive role of European political parties regarding the progress of integration, the CSP became the Party of European Socialists (PES): the new orgnization was meant to perform a better linkage function between all the components of the Social-democratic movement in Europe on the one hand, and to provide for a common ideological platform on the other hand . In 1995, the statutes of the PES changed again to bring more supranationalism as accounted by the introduction of decision-making by qualified majority voting. Given the PES’ ambitions, this paper will try to explain to what extent the PES performs the function of a catalyst for a common identity of European Social Democracy. In this respect, it will first enlarge on the elements accounting for the emergence of a common ideology, going then to the institutional constraints affecting the role of the PES; finally, there will be an analysis of the meaning of the rejection of the Constitutional treaty by the left-wing of the French Socialist Party and its electorate for the topic at stake.
The first step draws back to 1974 with the creation of the Confederation of the Socialist Parties (CSP) of the European Community related to the coming first direct election of the Assembly of the EC in 1979. At this early stage, the CSP was a very weak entity: on the organisational level, its was little more than appendices of the national parties ; while on the ideological level it was devided on the issue of European integration as a consequence of the Northern enlargement and the membership of the British, Danish and Irish Labour parties . With the introduction of Article 138 A in the Treaty of Maastricht and the recognition of the positive role of European political parties regarding the progress of integration, the CSP became the Party of European Socialists (PES): the new orgnization was meant to perform a better linkage function between all the components of the Social-democratic movement in Europe on the one hand, and to provide for a common ideological platform on the other hand . In 1995, the statutes of the PES changed again to bring more supranationalism as accounted by the introduction of decision-making by qualified majority voting. Given the PES’ ambitions, this paper will try to explain to what extent the PES performs the function of a catalyst for a common identity of European Social Democracy. In this respect, it will first enlarge on the elements accounting for the emergence of a common ideology, going then to the institutional constraints affecting the role of the PES; finally, there will be an analysis of the meaning of the rejection of the Constitutional treaty by the left-wing of the French Socialist Party and its electorate for the topic at stake.
Table of Contents
- Background and brief historical overview of the PES' development.
- A role constrained by the institutional features of the EU party politics .
- Case study: an attempt to shed light on the french socialist ´no´ to the Constitutional treaty .
1
knowledge network
Sort by
Subject :
Type :
Extension :
Language :
Size :