What is the Type Identity Theory of Physicalism?
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published 04/01/2008
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SummaryThe type identity theory of physicalism is the idea, as outlined by David Lewis (Journal of Philosophy, 63, pp 17-25), that “every experience is identical with some physical state.” Experiences and states in this sense are to be taken as universals, and not as particulars, which is where the type identity theory differs from the token identity theory.
In this essay I will look at the type identity theory as outlined by Lewis, and also the problem of whether this theory can accommodate the idea that mental states are variably realisable in animals of different physical natures. This problem is talked about in the article “The Nature of Mental States” by Hilary Putnam (1979).
In this essay I will look at the type identity theory as outlined by Lewis, and also the problem of whether this theory can accommodate the idea that mental states are variably realisable in animals of different physical natures. This problem is talked about in the article “The Nature of Mental States” by Hilary Putnam (1979).
Table of Contents
- The main argument that Lewis gives.
- This principle, as Lewis says, is not in itself a materialist principle.
- This argument does seem appealing in many ways.
- Putnam does not identify mental states with physical states.
- Putnam's theory has some difficulties too.
- The real problems occur when looking at the case of a mad Martian.
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